

The Julanda of Oman

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TWO FAMILIES of south-east Arabia came to bear the title *Julandā* (var. *Julundā*), the *Julandā* b. Karkar who feature in the history of the Gulf from pre-Islamic until Büyid times, and the *Ma'wali Julandā* who more or less controlled the Oman (correctly 'Umān) region until the full establishment of the Ibāḍi Imamate at the end of the eighth century. It is with the latter that this study is concerned.

The Shanu'a Migration

The origin of the *Ma'wali Julandā* fortunes lies in the obscure history of the second major wave of Arab migration into Oman.¹ Why so many members of the 'Uthmān b. Naṣr b. Zahrān branch of the so-called Shanu'a Azd left their original homeland in the Sarāt and Ḥijāz uplands is not clear, and we know virtually nothing of the political organisation which divided the emigrants into two major confederations, the Yaḥmad and the Awlād Shams (var. Shums). Nor do we know anything about the history of the start of their passage through central Arabia, except that it was probably during this period that they developed good relations with certain Kinda clans. On the other hand a few scraps of information about their history in al-Yamāma have come to us and these indicate that there they gained some ascendancy over the Ḥanifa tribes but made enemies of the local 'Āmir b. Ṣaṣa' groups.

They also show that it was probably then that the family from the Ma'āwil clan of the Awlād Shams which was later to be called *Julandā* gained its leadership over the Shanu'a, for the first named member of the line is given as 'Abd 'Izz, the man responsible for subjecting al-Yamāma (c.f. genealogical diagram p. 106). There too, it is recorded, he installed members of the Yaḥmad (possibly from the Khalili family of the Bani Kharūṣ) as governors over the region (c.f. 'Awtabi Johnstone ms 212 v *et seq* with Ibn Durayd *Ishtiqāq* Cairo 1958 edn. 508 and Ibn Qutayba Okacha edn. 108). And it was 'Abd 'Izz who started raiding the peoples of the sea-lands (*ahl al-'abāb*) by which term may probably be understood the settled communities of the Gulf under Persian rule.

The onward progression of the Shanu'a into Persian controlled Mazūn (Oman) however, was probably not initiated by the Ma'āwil themselves but by their "brother" tribe the Ḥuddān, for it seems it was they who pioneered settlement in the hill region of the Sirr around Yanqul (the Jabal Ḥuddān). But however that may be, the main Shanu'a groupings were almost certainly established in the mountains of Oman before the end of Kawādh's weak rule (i.e. early sixth century AD), with their individual tribes occupying the valleys of the Ghadaf, that is the eastern side of the Jabal al-Akhḍar central mountain core (the Jabal Yaḥmad): and it was probably in association with this migration into Oman that elements of the Kinda (notably from the Sakūn, the Bani a-Ḥārith al-Asghar and Bani Thābit b. Rafd. b. al-Ḥārith al-Akbar) also came to the country to settle in the Jabal Kinda, that is in the hills behind Tu'ām (Buraimi).²

Such a massive influx of new tribes into Oman obviously required some regulation of relationships with the older Arab settlers on the one hand³ and with the Persians on the other.

The Azd Union in Oman

Now for the most part the earlier Arab migrations to Oman had tended to settle in the desert borderlands on the western side of the mountains, and had not penetrated the mountain zone, except at the ends of the range where the build-up of tribes entering along the northern and southern migration routes into the region had pushed some groups into the neighbouring upland valleys. Basically therefore little territorial conflict arose between these older settlers and the newcomers who occupied the mountain pastures, and this in turn meant that nothing fundamentally impeded a general merging of their political organisation; on the contrary there was much to be said for tribal unification once Kisra Anūshiravān started to re-establish Persian control over Eastern Arabia.

The framework of the new Arab political structure was the union of all the Azd elements living in the country⁴ under the leadership of the Ma'wali shaikhs, an assimilation that was largely made possible as the result of the long-established Bani Hinā (correctly Hunā'a) shaikhs (Bani Muḥāriba section?) ceding paramount leadership to the heads of the Shānu'a confederation. These Azd formed four major groupings: the Bani Salīma of south-eastern Oman and coastal Kirmān, who themselves retained close relationships with their "half-brothers" the Bani Hinā, despite their quarrel with certain other important Mālik b. Fahm tribes (it was from this group that originated the Julandā b. Karkar); the rest of the Mālik b. Fahm confederation, many of whom directly followed the Bani Hinā and whose area of settlement extended all the way round from the region of Rāyṣūt on the south Arabian coast to the fringes of al-Bahrayn where their allies the 'Abd al-Qays predominated: the 'Imrān Azd of northern Oman led by the 'Atik who themselves had come to an accommodation with their chief political rivals in the region, the Bani Nājīya (Sāma b. Lu'ay) and were strong supporters of the Bani Hinā; and finally the newly arrived Shānu'a Azd who controlled the mountain area of Oman.

With such a widespread distribution and with one or other of these groups controlling all the major regions of south-east Arabia it is little wonder that Balādhuri (*Futūh*, 76) states that the people of Oman were the Azd and the importance of the union between the Bani Hinā and Ma'āwil shaikhs speaks for itself (this fusing of political interests was rationalized in clan terms by the genealogical linking of their forebears at respectively the seventh and sixth forebears: c.f. *Nubdha fi Ansāb al-Ma'āwil*⁵).

Arab-Persian relationships

Faced with this massive new tribal union, Kawādh's successor had little alternative but to accord the Arabs a degree of autonomy and recognise their territorial rights in certain regions though still determined on bringing Oman, along with the rest of the Arabian coast, under the full control of central Persian Government. The result was a formal understanding which was honoured by both sides until the time of Islam.

Since the nature of the Arab-Persian relationships in late Sasānid times has already been discussed by the writer at some length (Wilkinson 1973 and 1974) it will be sufficient here simply to summarise the relevant points.

The Arabs enjoyed full autonomy in the desert borderlands and in much of northern Oman where their inland capital was at Tu'ām and their main trading port at Dibā (Dabā). However, in the main part of Mazūn (that is the principal settled area of interior Oman and the commercially important coastal areas) the Persians ruled directly and such of the Arabs who had settled in the villages were simply treated in the same way as the rest of the subject peasantry (*ahl al-bilād*) as too were the detribalized Arabs employed in the Persian marine. The tribal organisation of the Arabs in their grazing-lands on the other hand was respected in so far as this did not give rise to conflict with the settled people.

In order to maintain overall control of interior Mazūn Kisra Anūshiravān modified the old feudal organization and established a military landed class (the *Asāwira* and *Marāziba*) who were directly answerable to the governor installed at Rustāq. This site was chosen as a major fortified centre for three main reasons: first it had relatively easy access both to the major trading port of Omana (Şuhār) where the main Persian garrison was quartered at Damstajird and to the fort of Damā (near modern al-Sib) which controlled the southern end of the Bāṭina coast; second it lay in a region of major new land-development; and third it was situated in the heart of the main Shānu'a settlement area.

At the same time the status of the Ma'wali shaikh was officially recognized and he was appointed as Julandā⁶ over the Arabs, a position analogous to the Arab *Iṣbādh* in al-Baḥrāyn and the *Abnā'* in south-west Arabia. This meant that his authority was reinforced by the Persian government and he was accorded the right to collect taxes in Arab territory; in return he was expected to maintain discipline amongst the tribesmen and consult with the Persian governor at Rustāq.

Thus during the seventy or so years prior to the coming of Islam the tribal role of the Ma'wali shaikhly clan was transformed into something nearer that of the princely dynasty of south-east Arabia and from then onwards they began to adopt the title as a family name (with the *nisba Julandāni*). Conversely the Arab tribes of Oman began to be welded together into something approaching a regional grouping and this sense of territorial identity was subsequently to play an important role in moulding their relationships with other Arab tribes during the period of the early Islamic conquests.

The Coming of Islam⁷

The great appeal Islam made to the Arabs of Oman was that it offered them the opportunity to throw off the hated Persian yoke, to take full possession of the land with its rich villages, and to reap the profits from the maritime trade of the Ard al-Hind (the Sasānid maritime empire).

Now in the period when the first feelers were being sent out from Madīna to Oman, the Ma'wali Julandā was still officially al-Julandā (sic) b. Mustakbir b. Mas'ūd b. al-Ḥarār (Jarār?) b. 'Abd Izz.⁸ But he was an old man for already he seems to have delegated power to his two sons Jayfar and 'Abd (sic): and by the time serious negotiations started after al-'Alā al-Haḍrami's mission to the Gulf he was either dead or dying and it is to be doubted if in fact he ever became a Muslim. The final decision to accept Islam resulted from 'Amr b. al-'Āṣ's mission (probably in A.H. 10, not 8). 'Amr appears to have had little difficulty in convincing the amenable 'Abd of his cause, but the latter refused to take action without the agreement of his senior brother (in age and position) who was then away in the interior. After his support had been gained 'Amr then remained in Oman to help with the subsequent negotiations with the tribesmen and reputedly only left, along with a delegation of Omanis, when news of the Prophet's death came through.

Following their conversion the Arabs then sent a formal letter to the Persians calling on them to become Muslims; and when their no-doubt-expected refusal was received, a tribal army was assembled by the Julandā brothers. This seems to have had little difficulty in defeating the Persian governor of Rustāq's forces (the 'āmil himself was killed in the battle) whereupon the triumphant Arabs marched on the main Persian centre at Şuhār and laid siege to the fortified garrison quarters of Damstajird. Eventually the Persians sued for peace and accepted safe conduct to their ships on the condition that they and their families never attempted to return to Oman.

So a millennium of Persian rule came to an end and the tribesmen took possession of the settled lands that had been so laboriously developed by the *falaj* irrigation system (Wilkinson in press).

The Diba affair⁹

All, however, was not quite the luxurious living that doubtless the majority of tribesmen had expected. In the first place the Arabs found that they were not free to exploit the great Persian land-heritage at will and what is more there was a governor appointed from Madina to ensure that they did not do so. Then they also discovered that they were still expected to pay taxes and that these were regularly collected by assessors appointed by this governor. Unfortunately for them he was actively supported by the Julandā brothers.

It is not surprising therefore that a group of malcontents in the Dibā area seized the excuse of a minor misunderstanding over the *zakāt* due from a woman of the Bani al-Ḥārith b. Mālik b. Fahm to rebel. Now in the classical sources the resulting fracas is represented as a major uprising that is in turn fitted into the general picture of the apostasy wars in Arabia. In fact a close study of these sources and of the local Omani versions of the affair show that it was nothing of the sort and that the rebellion was quickly stamped out by the Madinese governor supported by the Julandā brothers without any outside assistance. The instigators of the affair were the Laqīt section of the Bani al-Ḥārith b. Mālik b. Fahm but it is just possible that they were supported by discontented members of the Julandā family living in Dibā. Nevertheless the situation was potentially dangerous because some of the other Mālik b. Fahm groups in the region came to their help and there was a considerable risk of the rebellion spreading to the rest of this confederation. This was why Hudhayfa b. Miḥṣan al-Ghafāni al-Bāriqi acted rapidly to place restrictions on the Mālik b. Fahm and to send hostages to Madina.

So any risk of a serious spread of apostasy was averted and all the indications are that the Julandā brothers came out of the affair with clean hands.

The Julanda during the first century of Islam

After the first half dozen or so years of Islamic rule in Oman, the picture of what was happening in the country becomes increasingly obscure. The emphasis swings to the involvement of the Omani tribes in the mainstream of Islamic history, notably in the conquests of the Sasānid lands, in ‘Irāqi politics and, most important, in their relationships with central government through their great military leader al-Muhallab b. Abi Ṣufra and his family.¹⁰ Only the most casual of references in the classical sources provides any clue to what might have been going on in the country itself while the local records lack any historical continuity.

Local governors may have been appointed from time to time¹¹ down to ‘Ali’s¹² caliphate but the impression gained is that in so far as this did happen the men concerned seem to have been minor officials whose limited power was largely confined to the main coastal centre, Ṣuhār: in the interior affairs were more or less left to ‘Abbād who, having succeeded his father ‘Abd and his uncle Jayfar¹³ during ‘Uthmān’s caliphate, ruled through to that of the Ummayads (al-Salimi *Tuhfa* i. 67).

An account in Balādhuri (*Ansāb* XI, 125–47) of the Khārijī state that came into existence under Najda b. ‘Āmir al-Hanafi in 65 A.H. and finally collapsed in 73 A.H. throws some incidental light on conditions in Oman at the end of his rule. In this it is stated that after defeating the army sent against him from Basra by Muṣ‘ab b. al-Zubayr in 69 A.H., Najda embarked on a campaign to bring the whole of the Arabian Peninsula under his control. Little resistance occurred in Oman because of the disordered conditions; specifically that the shāikh, ‘Ubād (‘Abbād) b. ‘Abdullāh (‘Abd) had recently been killed in an uprising while at the time of the invasion both his sons were away at sea collecting taxes in the coastal districts. Subsequently they returned and killed the Najdi governor and that seems to have been the end of the Hanafi occupation.

Now the impression gained from this account and from odd snippets of information in the Omani sources is that Julandā power was by no means absolute in the country and that clan disputes were undermining their authority. Furthermore there is some indication that their rule was becoming "despotic" for the fact that Balādhuri uses the term *jabā* without his usual addition of *ṣadaqa* for collecting taxes may imply that these were not lawful impositions.¹⁴ Whether or not such an interpretation is accepted, the fact remains that this slim evidence certainly indicates that Oman was already abandoning the early principles of Islamic government and that exploitation of the land by squabbling tribes was already dividing the country in a way that was subsequently to help the Ibādīs introduce a new form of government.

During Sa‘id and Sulaymān’s period of joint rule which followed these events¹⁵ Oman became an increasingly important sanctuary for all sorts of groups opposed to Caliphate government and a particularly active centre of Ṣufriya Khārijism.¹⁶ It was in order to clean up this wasps’ nest that al-Hajjāj b. Yūsuf decided that the country must be brought back under central government rule.¹⁷ After the first expedition had failed he recruited a major force from the tribal enemies of the Azd, restrained the latter’s leaders in Basra from sending any assistance, and by means of a two-pronged attack by land and sea his general was eventually successful in defeating the Julandā brothers who fled to East Africa (Zanj), where they resided until their death.

Al-Hajjāj’s invasion of Oman probably took place about A.H. 86 and the governor he appointed, al-Khayyār b. Sabra b. Dhuwayb al-Mujāshi‘i, remained there until the death of the Caliph Walid in 96/715. As might be expected of one who was prepared to betray the Muhallabite family that had fostered his career, his rule was harsh, and al-Hajjāj seems to have been sufficiently confident of his hold over Oman to use it as a place of exile: amongst those whom he sent there were a number of leaders of the nascent Ibādī movement (Shammākhi 76 and 81) who doubtless used the opportunity of their enforced stay to propagate their doctrine in the region.

With the succession of Sulaymān to the Caliphate, Yazid b. al-Muhallab was restored to favour and one of his first acts on being appointed to the governorship of ‘Irāq was to delegate responsibility in Oman to his brother Ziyād with orders that al-Khayyār be executed. After the short interlude of ‘Umar II’s government when Oman was again brought back under direct Caliphate rule, the last of his governors ‘Umar b. ‘Abdullāh al-Anṣārī (who had carried out a serious reform of the taxation system) simply handed the country back to Ziyād with the remark that this was the country of his people and his affair. And that seems to have been the end of Umayyad appointments. Ziyād reputedly stayed on in Oman until ‘Abbāsid times but after the death of his brother his influence was doubtless much reduced and it was the Julandā who once again feature as leaders, at least in the tribal interior.

But these conditions were beginning to change.

The Imam al-Julandā b. Mas‘ūd

Having for well over half a century enjoyed considerable prestige and wealth the fortunes of the extra-territorial Omanis were brusquely reversed with the overthrow of Yazid b. al-Muhallab so that from 720 A.D. onwards they began to adopt one of the new forms of Khārijī ideology propagated in Basra as a basis for opposing Caliphate government. So with this adherence of many of the Oman Azd (notably of certain Mālik b. Fahm clans and some of the Yamani tribes from Ḥaḍramawt) the Ibādī movement entered into a new phase of political militancy (c.f. Wilkinson 1975).

Nevertheless the political approach of the so-called Basran ‘Imāms’ remained essentially cautious so that for some time their activities continued to be confined to doctrinal teaching and secret missionary

work aimed at preparing the way for the establishing of Ibādi states in areas where there was strong opposition to the Caliphate when the moment for action was deemed propitious. Since this involved directing reforming propaganda at the tribesmen of Oman as well as the more cosmopolitan merchant community (many of whose members were already secretly financing the movement), it inevitably met opposition from the Julandā whose power was rooted in the traditional tribal system of shaikhly authority.

Perhaps because of this the Ibādis persisted in trying to win them over, for it was obviously in an attempt to gain their support that they offered one of them the Imamate itself. At least this is the interpretation the writer puts on the fact that the first Imām in Oman was a Julandā, even though no member of this family had hitherto featured in the history of the movement.

Now this Imām, al-Julandā b. Mas‘ūd, belongs to the period when the Ibādis first attempted to establish states in the Peninsula and North Africa at the end of Umayyad times. The highlight of these efforts was the sensational, but short lived success¹⁸ of a joint Omani-Ḥadrami force in taking Yaman and the Holy Cities (during the *hajj* 129 A.H.) and installing as Imām there, ‘Abdullāh b. Yaḥyā al-Kindi, known as Ṭālib al-Ḥaqqa. For a few years the rump of this state survived in the Ḥadramawt but collapsed as much due to internal divisions as to outside pressures. Any notional adherence of the Omanis to it disappeared when ‘Abdullāh b. Sa‘īd, Ṭālib al-Ḥaqqa’s successor, was deposed (c.f. in particular al-Ṣalimi *Tuhfa* i, 112; Shammākhi 105–6; Lewicki 1957).

Thereupon an effort was made to organise an Ibādi state in Oman itself. Its eventual success was considerably helped by the fact that the first governors Abu Ja‘far Manṣūr appointed on behalf of his brother (the Caliph al-Saffāḥ) were two members of the Bani Hinā (now heads of the Azd clans in Basra and Khurāsān), Jannāḥ b. ‘Abbāda and his son Muḥammed who were secretly Ibādi sympathisers (‘Awtabi Johnstone ms. 204–6: c.f. al-Mas‘ūdi *Mu‘rij* vi, 45–6 and Ṭabarī iii 146, 152, 367–8 for the role of the Bani Hinā in this period). So the Ibādi movement flourished at the official seat of ‘Abbāsid government in Oman and many adherents from outside the area, notably from South Arabia and Khurāsān, began to collect in Ṣuhār. Eventually al-Julandā b. Mas‘ūd was selected as Imām of the community, but in such a way, to judge by subsequent events, as not to defy openly the ‘Irāqi government.¹⁹

The subsequent attempt to bring the interior of the country under Ibādi rule met stiff opposition both from the tribesmen, by now accustomed to live much as they pleased, and from members of the Imām’s own family. Probably part of this Julandā opposition stemmed from internal clan rivalry for while the Imām al-Julandā descended from Jayfar b. al-Julandā,²⁰ his chief opponent was Ja‘far b. Sa‘īd (presumably b. ‘Abbād b. ‘Abd), head of the cadet branch of the family into whose hands, as we have already seen, power passed early in Islamic times (c.f. genealogical tree). However that may be, the fact remains that the Imām had no hesitation in executing Ja‘far and his two sons along with various other relations, even though the necessity for doing so reputedly brought tears to his eyes. With a blood feud added to the other causes for opposition, the Julandā family now became the implacable enemies of the Ibādi movement.

The end of al-Julandā b. Mas‘ūd’s brief Imāmate however, came not from this internal opposition, which seems eventually to have been effectively subjugated by the Ibādi *shurāt* organisation (c.f. the near contemporary Munir b. Nayr al-Riyāmi’s *sīra* quoted in Salimi *Tuhfa* i, 89–92), but from what was really a piece of bad luck.

Sometime about the year A.H. 133 (750–1 A.D.) al-Saffāḥ had despatched an expedition under Khāzim b. Khuzayma al-Khurāsāni largely made up of Khurāsānis and Tamīm from Basra to deal with the remnants of the Ṣufriya who had finally entrenched themselves in the island of Barkavān (Laft

Island). On hearing of the expedition's approach the majority of the Ṣufriya fled with their Imām to nearby Oman: and it is a measure of Ibādi-Ṣufriya feeling that the former immediately marched out against the refugees, defeating them and killing their leader. Khāzim, still in pursuit crossed over to Oman only to find on landing at Julfār (Ras al-Khayma area) his work done for him. Before leaving, however, he decided to ensure that the Omanis were still loyal to the Caliph (in other words what had been going on in the country seems to have been effectively hushed up)²¹ and demanded their oath of allegiance along with the surrender of the Ṣufri leader's sword. After some argument the more belligerent of the Ibādis persuaded the Imām to refuse and a battle was fought in which the Imām and his staunchest supporter, Hilāl b. 'Atīya al-Khurāsāni, were killed (in 134 A.H.? c.f. Ṭabari iii, 78-9).

The Final Period of Julandā rule

With the death of al-Julandā b. Mas'ūd, whose active Imamate seems to have lasted not more than a couple of years, the Ibādi state collapsed, albeit for a while Shabib b. 'Atīya al-Khurāsāni (probably a brother of the Hilāl killed alongside al-Julandā b. Mas'ūd at Julfār) ineffectively attempted to keep a vestigial community in existence.²² On the other hand the 'Abbāsids appear to have made no attempt to appoint governors, doubtless contenting themselves with the nominal allegiance of the two orphaned grandsons of the executed Ja'far b. Sa'id, Rāshid b. al-Nazr and Muhammed b. Zā'ida, who now took over power in the joint fashion that seems to have characterised so much Julandā rule. And, as also seems to have been usual, one of the brothers begins to drop out of the picture so that when the Julandā were finally overthrown some 44 years later it is Rāshid alone who figures in the histories.

Two principal factors were responsible for the overthrow of the last of the Julandā rulers. First Rāshid's conduct of government which, even allowing for prejudiced Ibādi reporting, was obviously unjust and alienated a number of the tribes of central Oman: second Ibādi opposition. The tribal situation will be explained first.

Towards the end of the Julandā period, the dynasty's power seems increasingly to have centred on the support of tribesmen living in the northern Jawf and Sirr, notably their ancient allies the Bani Hinā who in turn remained closely allied with the 'Atīk shaikhs of the 'Imrān Azd, and the Bani Nājiya (var. Nājū). By contrast the old Azd confederation itself was beginning to break up for while the Ḥuddān (also a northern tribe) probably remained loyal to the Julandā the important Yaḥīmad confederation in the Ghadaf seems to have become disillusioned with Ma'wali leadership: similarly the Bani Hinā hold over the Mālik b. Fahm tribe seems to have weakened, notably amongst the groups living in the southern part of the country.²³

It was against this background of declining control in central Oman that the Muḥāribi shaikh of the Bani Hinā attacked Nizwā in 145/762 and by so doing set off a major tribal war.²⁴ The outcome favoured the Julandā allies who fortified Nizwā in order to try and maintain a control over the region.²⁵ But much bitter feeling was engendered by this bloody episode and it was this that the Ibādis exploited to bring off their final victory some thirty years later.

Now despite the collapse of their Imamate the Ibādi movement remained very much alive in Oman and as has already been mentioned, a self-styled Imām even managed to keep a vestigial community organisation going for some time in one part of the country (possibly the Izki area for this seems to have been the main centre of Ibādism during the interregnum). Without any formal leadership however, the zealots started to act on their own initiative and the more extremist elements became a particular embarrassment to the Ibādi leadership in Basra. Thus when one group of them murdered a member of the Julandā family called 'Abd al-'Azīz while staying as guests in his house the Julandā directly accused

the Basran Ibādīs of instigating the act and threatened to carry their complaint to the Caliphate authorities.²⁶ Whether the denial of the “Imām” was accepted or not is not recounted but the fact remains that the act was condemned and a man was sent to Oman with clear instructions that those who supported the movement were to behave in the way ordained for true Muslims (al-Sālimi *Tuhfa*; 102–3).

But once Julandā rule began to divide the tribesmen themselves however, Basran-organised propaganda really was stepped-up and a number of prominent Ibādīs were able to come back to central Oman to live in a degree of safety. So, for example, Abu ‘Amr Rabi’ b. Ḥabib al-Farāhidi (Mālik b. Fahm clan), the author of the *Musnad* called *al-Jāmi‘ al-Saḥīḥ* and successor of Abu ‘Ubayda Muslim b. Abi Karīma as “Imām” in Basra, finally returned to his home country and was politically active there until his death at Nizwā in 170/786, that is seven years before Julandā rule was finally overthrown.

The principal objective of this propaganda was to convert the non-Azd tribes so that they would eventually support what inevitably would be an Azd dominated Imamate: thus, the three main missionaries were non-Azdi Basran trained ‘ulamā’, two from the Bani Sāma (that is the main non-“Yamani” tribe) and one from the Kinda: at a later stage they were joined by a Riyāmi who worked in his tribal territory in the Ja‘lān (south-east Oman). (‘Awtabi Johnstone ms 207 *et passim*; *Kashf* Damascus ms 527 c.f. also Sachau 1898, 14; *Qānūn al-Shari‘a* viii 304; Shammākhi 102 *et seq.*).

Inciting the various elements opposed to Julandā rule into organized revolt however, was a difficult matter and at least one attempt involving the Basran missionaries failed (al-Sālimi *Tuhfa*, 108). In the end it was only on the common ground of swearing vengeance against Rāshid b. al-Naṣr that a tribal army was assembled at a propitious moment when the Julandā shaikh was away in Mahra territory recruiting a force to help him weather the gathering storm. And it is significant that neither of the Sāmi Ibādī leaders was prepared to join this motley rabble and that the only really important Ibādī figure who actually supported it was the Kindi missionary.

Battle was joined at a place called Majāza in the Dhahira (al-Zāhira) which was probably in the territory of the Bani Nājīya, numerically Rāshid b. al-Naṣr’s most important tribal supporters in northern Oman. Overwhelmingly defeated Rāshid fled, as did his son from Nizwā, and the victorious tribesmen, settling old scores as they went, gathered at Manh where they were met by the main Ibādī leaders before continuing on their way to deal with south-east Oman (al-Sālimi *Tuhfa* i, 109–113).

How eventually the wily Mūsā b. Abi Jābir al-Sāmi managed to turn this essentially anti-Julandā tribal victory into Ibādī account and install al-Wārith b. al-Kā‘b al-Kharūṣi of the Yāḥmād as the first of the main line of Imams which governed Oman during most of the ninth century A.D. is a subject which lies outside the scope of this paper.

The End of the Julanda

Although it is not recounted what eventually happened to Rāshid b. al-Naṣr and his son it is clear that Julandā power was not finally crushed by their military defeat at Majāza in Ramaḍān 177/December 793. The attempts to justify the depredations of the victorious tribesmen by the Ibādī leaders (c.f. al-Sālimi *Tuhfa* i, 109–10; 112–113) precluded any reconciliation of the Julandā supporters with the new regime and the Bani Muḥāriba Shaikh of the Bani Hinā continued to give serious trouble to the Yāḥmād Imāms until the very end of Ghassān b. ‘Abdullah al-Yāḥmādi’s Imāmate (192/808–207/823) (‘Awtabi Johnstone ms 206).

The fact too that the rise to power of the Kharūṣ as Imāms tribally represented a Yāḥmād rejection of the Awlād Shams leadership finally split the old Shānu‘a organisation and it is possible that the adherence of the Ḥuddān to the rival confederation in the civil war which brought to a close the First “Ima-

mate" at the end of the ninth century may have its roots in this earlier tribal history. Certainly the rivalry of the northern tribes to those of central Oman manifest in that war had deep roots.

So the Julandā still had plenty of tribal support and in 822 A.D. Ṣaqr b. Muḥammed b. Zā'ida (the son of the younger brother who had jointly ruled with Rāshid b. al-Naṣr) was able to lead quite a serious revolt against the Imām (al-Sālimi *Tuhfa* i, 123-5). This however, seems to have been their final important challenge, and with the deaths of al-Ṣaqr and his brother in these events the princely line must more or less have come to an end.

Names of members of the family do crop up twice more. Once in the Imamate of Muḥannā b. Jayfar (226/841-237/851) when the head of the clan, one al-Mughīrā b. Rawshan (sp.?) al-Julandāni, caused trouble in northern Oman and was ruthlessly dealt with (al-Sālimi *Tuhfa* i, 154-5) and then in the events which led up to the civil war which marked the end of the First Imamate, when Abu Julandā b. Mi'rān, known by the unflattering sobriquet of al-Tals, led a raiding party against that clan which had "usurped" the leadership of Oman, i.e. the Yāḥmad of the Rustāq area (al-Sālimi *Tuhfa* i, 222).

Today the descendants of this family which dominated Omani history for something like 300 years are said to live as simple *shayvāwi* herdsmen in the mountains, notably in the Sharqiya. One of its members, Sa'īd b. 'Abbād is celebrated as the reputed eponymous ancestor of the Bani Sa'īd of the Wadi al-Ḥawāsina (some of whom also live in the Sharqiya) while the highly respected Bani Ma'āwil perpetuate the name of the tribal group from which the Julandā originally sprung and continue to use "Ya Awlād Shams" as their war-cry. (*Nubdha fi Ansāb al-Ma'āwil*; *Siyābi*, pp. 108-9; Rössler 1898; *al-Ṣahifa al-Qaḥṭāniya* ff. 262-274). But the rival branch, their cousins the Yāḥmad, who gained power by adopting the principles of Ibādism continued to dominate the history of the Imamate right down to the death in 1954 of the Imām Muḥammed b. 'Abdullāh al-Khalili al-Kharūši al-Yāḥmadi.

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
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The Julandā Dynasty

‘Uthmān b. Naṣr b. Zahrān branch of the Shanu’ā AZD



— = direct descent

- - - = tribal affiliations.

¹ The principal source for the tribal background of this study is the *Kitāb Ansāb al-‘Arab* by the 5th/11th century Salma b. Muslim Musallim? al-Awtabi al-Šuhārī ('Awtabi). It is only by a detailed study of this work that the fragmentary evidence in the other Omani works can be pieced together: these, along with certain classical sources with Omani knowledge (notably Ibn Durayd) on the other hand, contribute to an understanding of the importance of the different clans as well as helping establishing their geographic distribution. The standard classical sources are essential for piecing together the relationships of the Oman tribes in Basra and Khurasān but are largely incomprehensible without a grasp of the tribal situation in Oman itself.

It is particularly unfortunate that the extant portion of 'Awtabi's work becomes increasingly defective in the section on the Azd and ends with a mass of lacunae in the section of greatest interest for this study, that dealing with the Shānu'a Azd.

² There is an extremely detailed account of the Kinda settlement pattern in Oman in 'Awtabi (Paris ms 173v-179r) which is far better than the Johnstone ms 118v-123r).

³ A rough map of this tribal distribution is given in Wilkinson 1972.

⁴ To what extent, if any, the earlier alliance that may have existed in the original homelands of the different Azd clans played a role in Oman it is impossible to say. It should be noted that the Bani Hinā seem willingly to have surrendered their leading position to the newcomers and as will be shown later on, remained the staunchest supporters of the Julandā through to the end of the dynasty.

⁵ This genealogical union doubtless explains why some poor scholars like Ibn Ruzayq think the Julandā are from the Bani Hinā (c.f. in *al-Saḥīfa al-Qaḥīrāniyya* 394v where the *nisba* Hinā'i is added to al-Julandā b. Mas'ūd's name). But as al-Sālimi (*Tulḥa* i 88) says anyone who gives the Julandā *nasab* as other than Ma'wila b. Shams is mistaken.

⁶ Unfortunately we have no etymology for this title as we have for the *Iṣbādhi* < *Iṣpabādhi* (Siddiqi 1919, 78-9): but that it was one is clear both from the context of the Arab-Persian treaty ('Awtabi Paris ms 271) and from positive classical sources (see in particular Bal'ami iii 307 *et seq.*, Ya'qūbi i 313-4). Nor do we know who was the first man to bear this title although it is fairly certain that Mustakbir (var. Mustanir) did (does the etymology of his name indicate he was the first?)

⁷ The details upon which this summarised account are based are given in Appendix B of the writer's thesis (Wilkinson 1969). The major material that does not feature in the classical sources (which are largely based on al-Wāqidi c.f. Ibn Sa'd I ii 18; Tabari i, 1561, 1600-1, 1686, 1894; Balādhūri *Futūḥ* 76) occurs in 'Awtabi (Paris ms 271-273 *et passim*) which should be read in conjunction with al-Sālimi *Tulḥa* i, 47 and 59 and *Kashf* edn Klein 8-9.

⁸ In the view of the writer this genealogy as given in 'Awtabi (whence al-Sālimi) is not compressed: on the other hand the tribal genealogy of the family i.e. 'Abd 'Izz b. Ma'wila b. Shams etc. is.

⁹ The details are worked out in Appendix C of the writer's thesis. Here there are three major accounts involved, that of Sayf b. 'Umar, the toned down Wāqidi version, and the local Omani account. Reconciling them is a major undertaking and the writer hopes in due course to publish an account of the apostasy war in Oman.

¹⁰ Julandā power seems to have been more or less confined to Oman itself, notably to the tribal interior. They appear not to have been at all concerned in the affairs of the Omani tribes in their overseas campaigns or in Basra where the shaikhly leadership in the Azd *khums* during the period under consideration was in the hands of the Ḥuddān, a brother tribe of the Ma'āwil and the 'Atik (the shaikhly clan of the 'Imrān Azd). After the collapse of the Muhallabites (who were military and not shaikhly leaders) it passed into the hands of the Bani Hinā.

¹¹ Although Tabari (i, 2212, 2389, 2426, 2481, 2570, 2578-9, 2595) and Ibn al-Athīr (ii, 346, 380, 396, 410) give the impression that Hudhayfa b. Miḥṣan remained governor in Oman until A.H. 17 or even A.H. 20, his engagement in Iraqi affairs and the Persian campaign raises doubt that he was there at all in 'Umar's time (c.f. Ibn al-Athīr ii 343, 359, 410-411, and Caetani iii 273 *et seq.* for the Iraqi traditions). In fact what seems to have happened is that about A.H. 15 the local governorships in the Gulf were consolidated under 'Uthmān b. Abi al-Āṣi who, it seems, had resided in Oman for a short while before this. 'Uthmān however, became increasingly involved in the campaigns based on Tawwāj (as too were the tribes of Oman) and left local affairs to the Julandā (who may even have held an official appointment as governor c.f. Ya'qūbi ii 136; al-Sālimi *Tulḥa* i, 67), contenting himself with the occasional visit of inspection by a member of his family. And once the major campaign of AH 29 was launched against the Persians and the Basran and Gulf commands were united local affairs became even less pre-occupying. (Balādhūri *Futūḥ* 81-2, 386; Tabari i 2830-2; Ibn al-Athīr iii 15-16; Ya'qūbi ii, 186; al-Sālimi *Tulḥa* i 67-9; 'Awtabi Paris ms 223 *et passim*; Caetani vii 246 *et passim*).

¹² According to Ya'qūbi ii 227-8 'Ali appointed an Azdi as his official governor in Oman: he was killed by Khirrīt b. Rāshid al-Nājī and his band of Khawārij (mostly Bani Nājīya of the Sāma b. Lu'ay) in A.H. 38 (Tabari i 3430-9 deriving mostly from Abu Mikhnaf; Ya'qūbi *loc cit*; Mas'ūdī *Mu'īj* ii, 418-9). The early Ummayads made no attempt to appoint a governor in Oman (al-Sālimi *Tulḥa* i 67).

¹³ Jayfar drops out of the picture early on, possibly because he died, but possibly because he was a less devoted Muslim than his younger brother (c.f. the Wāqidi version of the Islamic conquest of Oman (sources quoted in fn 9): note too that 'Abd reputedly took part in one of the very early Islamic expeditions, that against the Jafna (the Ghassānids) of Shām (*Kashf* edn Klein 10; al-Sālimi *Tulḥa* i, 63). The last time Jayfar's name occurs is shortly after the battle of Jalūlā (A.H. 16) when the brothers were requested by 'Uthmān b. Abi al-Āṣi to recruit an army for campaigning in Persia ('Awtabi Paris ms 223 and Johnstone ms 160).

¹⁴ In this connection of taxing the coastal districts it is worth noting that those who gained a living from fishing were classed as *masākīn* and exempted from taxes under Ibāḍī rulings introduced in the Imam al-Julandā b. Mas'ūd's time (Salimi *Tulḥa* i 89).

¹⁵ There is some confirmation that they controlled Oman in A.H. 72 in Yāqūt (*Mu'jam al-Buldān* art. Maskin) where Sulaymān b. Sa'īd b. al-Šaqr b. al-Julandā (*sic*) is reported as being the leading figure in the country.

¹⁶ 'Imrān b. Ḥittān al-Shaybānī (who was considered by the Ṣufriya to be the true successor of Abu Bilāl, Miřdās (b. Hudayr) b. 'Udayya, "martyred" 61/680-1), finally took refuge in Oman with a group of Azd after the collapse of the Bani Shaybān revolt in northern Iraq and stayed there until his death in A.H. 89 (Baghdādī 92-3; al-Mubarrad *Kāmil* 532-3; 'Awtabi Johnstone ms 125v-127r, *Kashf* Damascus ms 385-7 and 525; Shammākhi 62).

¹⁷ Mention of this invasion only occurs in the Omani sources c.f. *Kashf* edn Klein 11–15 and Sālimi *Tuhfa* i 74–8. Although it is not reported by 'Awtabi his very important biography of Yazid b. al-Muhallab (Johnstone ms 166v–171r) does help fit this Omani history in perspective viz-a-viz the Caliphate and also clarifies the name the various governors appointed after the time of this invasion down to the end of 'Umar II's caliphate.

¹⁸ For its history see Tabari ii, 1942–3, 1981–3, 2006–15 (c.f. also Mas'ūdī *Murūj* vi, 66–7, Ibn al-Athīr v 297–301); Ibn Miskawayh *Fragmenta* i, 167–179; *Kashf al-Ghumma* Damascus ms 389–399; Shammākhī 98–9.

¹⁹ For the events of al-Julandā b. Mas'ūd's Imamate see in particular al-Sālimi *Tuhfa* i, 88–101.

²⁰ If his genealogy has not been compressed and he was indeed the grandson of Jayfar then he must have been pretty old for Jayfar was active at the very beginning of Islamic time.

²¹ One should remember that the Ibāḍī organisation in Basra must have kept a pretty close eye on the movement of Omanis; with so many secret sympathisers it may well have been difficult for a complainant from Oman to reach the Caliphate authorities safely. Besides, none of the Omani groups involved was particularly anxious to call in outsiders to intervene in their internal affairs.

²² The main information on Shabib b. 'Afīya is to be found in al-Sālimi *Tuhfa* 104–6 but there are some slightly different variations in the *Qānūn al-Shari'a* viii, 104; the *Kashf* Damascus ms 527 indicates that he was a Khurāsāni.

²³ The Bani Hinā leadership over the rest of the Mālik b. Fahm tribes had never gone entirely unchallenged and a particularly important standing squabble seems to have existed with the Ma'n, a dispute incidentally which also played a role in the temporary change of Azd leadership in Basra following the influx of new Mālik b. Fahm tribes that led up to the events of A.H. 64.

²⁴ The Bani Hinā attack on Nizwā was directed at its two main tribes, the Bani Humaym section of the Ma'n (c.f. fn.23) and the Bani Nāfi' clan of the Sāma b. Lu'ay. The Bani Nāfi' were the leading "Nizārī" tribe in the Lower Jawf and had more or less broken away from the main mass of the Bani Nāfiya, the Julandā supporters; it was to this clan that Bashīr b. al-Mundhīr, one of the main Ibāḍī missionaries, belonged. This Bani Hinā attack brought to the support of the Nizwā groups the leading Mālik b. Fahm elements in the Sharqiya (the Bani Hārith of Ibrā and probably the Jahādīn of Samad) thus escalating the whole affair into a major tribal war. The importance of this war is brought out by the fact that it is mentioned in all Omani sources, even the shortened "standard *sīras*", but its significance has been lost in the passage of time and can only be reconstituted by piecing together the general tribal picture. For a full account of it see 'Awtabi, Paris ms 276 whence, more or less, at Sālimi *Tuhfa* i, 107–8, and *Kashf* edn Klein 17. It should be noted that Ross' translation of the *Kashf* version is highly misleading: it was the people of Ibrā who were defeated and not the other way round and the "slave" of the Bakra was not a slave but a member of the Bakra clan of the 'Abd al-Qays (*nisba* 'Abdi).

²⁵ It is fairly clear from al-Sālimi (*Tuhfa* i, 115–6, 125 and passing references dealing with the establishment of the Imamate) that Nizwā was developed as a kind of fortified capital by the last of the Julandās. All the evidence points to the fact that this development postdates the plundering of Nizwā incident of Sha'bān 145/Oct 762.

²⁶ This event must have occurred fairly soon after the death of al-Julandā b. Mas'ūd for the two leaders whom the Julandā visited in Basra were the "Imām" Abu 'Ubayda Muslim b. Abi Karima and Abu Mawdūd Hājib, both of whom died in Abu Ja'far Mānūr's reign, the latter first (Shammākhī 83, 85, 90–2, 106; *Qānūn al-Shari'a* viii 800; *Kashf* Damascus ms. 526).