

THE REWARD OF THE PHARAOHS: EGYPTIAN ROYAL GRANTS AND GIFTS FOR THE RULERS OF CANAAN IN THE AMARNA LETTERS

MOHY-ELDIN E. ABO-ELEAZ
mohe.elnady@mu.edu.eg
Minia University
Minia, Egypt

Summary: The Reward of the Pharaohs: Egyptian Royal Grants and Gifts for the Rulers of Canaan in the Amarna Letters

The present study explores and analyzes the grants and gifts awarded by the Pharaohs to the Canaanite rulers through a variety of evidence from the Amarna letters. This analysis considers the reasons for requesting or granting—whether from the sender or the receiver—in political, ideological, economic, and social terms. The study reveals that the request for gifts was not exclusively between the Great Kings, the methods of requesting/exchanging gifts between Pharaohs and their vassals was similar to that between the Pharaohs and the other Great Kings of the Near East. The study also concludes that providing grants and exchanging gifts took place under the policy of persuasion and reciprocal exploitation, according to the Egyptian and Levantine perspectives. Egypt was the side that benefitted most from this exchange in accordance with the concepts of sovereignty and domination because it was one of the most efficient methods that kept these vassals' loyalty to Egypt at the lowest costs.

Keywords: Reward – Grant, Gift – New Kingdom – Amarna Letters – Syria-Palestine

Resumen: La recompensa de los faraones: concesiones y regalos de la realeza egipcia para los gobernantes de Canaan según las Cartas de El Amarna

El presente estudio explora y analiza las concesiones y regalos otorgados por los faraones a los gobernantes cananeos a través de una variedad de evidencias provenientes de las cartas de El Amarna. Este análisis considera las razones para solicitar u otorgar dichos regalos—ya sea por parte del emisor o del receptor—en términos políticos, ideológicos, económicos y sociales. El estudio revela que la solicitud de regalos no era exclusiva entre Grandes Reyes, y que los métodos de solicitud/inter-

* Article received: January 18, 2021; approved: April 02, 2021.

cambio de regalos entre los faraones y sus vasallos era similar al de los faraones y otros Grandes Reyes del Cercano Oriente. El estudio también concluye que, según las perspectivas egipcia y levantina, la entrega de subvenciones y el intercambio de regalos se realizaron bajo la política de persuasión y explotación recíproca. De acuerdo con los conceptos de soberanía y dominación, Egipto fue la parte más beneficiada de este intercambio, que constituía uno de los métodos más eficaces para mantener la lealtad de sus vasallos a un coste mínimo.

Palabras clave: Recompensa – Concesión, Regalo – Reino Nuevo – Cartas de Amarna – Siria-Palestina

INTRODUCTION

The chronological and geographical focus of the present study is confined to an analysis of the Amarna letters, thought to span a period of at most three decades in the latter half of the fourteenth century B.C.¹ It is through this unique corpus of texts that we can gain a better understanding of the political, cultural, and social organization of Egypt's holdings in Syria-Palestine, specifically in this paper as they pertain to royal gifts, grants and the diplomatic role of royal gifts and grants.

Gift-exchange in the Amarna letters has usually been portrayed as a phenomenon involving the “Great Kings” of the Near East and it has therefore been analyzed as a form of diplomacy *stricto sensu*, between equal partners in a purportedly symmetrical relation. On the other hand, the phenomenon of gift-exchange in an asymmetrical relation, i.e. between the Egyptian Pharaoh and the “petty” rulers of the Levant, has hardly ever been discussed in an exhaustive manner. Therefore, the present study represents an extensive contribution in this regard.

Several previous studies have examined the exchange of royal gifts between Egypt and the Great Kingdoms (i.e., Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, Mitanni, Hittite, Arzawa, and Alashiya),² and a number of scholars have offered interpretations of the ancient Egyptian terms for

¹ Mynářová 2015a: 150.

² Cochavi-Rainey 1999; Liverani 2000: 24-26; Bryce 2003: 89-98; Jakob 2006: 12-30; Podany 2010: 243-264; Gestoso Singer 2016: 159-182.

items such as *b3kw*, *inw* and *bi3t* (tributes, taxes, wonders, gifts/ offerings and produces?) offered to the Pharaoh by petty Levantine kings.³ This study addresses the ideology of grants and gifts by defining requesting and receiving strategies and practices involving the Pharaoh and these vassals and analyzing their political, economic and social purposes.

A significant obstacle to accomplishing this task has been that, with the exception of a few letters (EA 99, 162-163, 190, 367, 369-370), the Amarna letters⁴ sent by Canaanite rulers (receivers of the gifts/grants) to the Pharaoh have been the sole sources on which to base any interpretations. Accordingly, this study will primarily examine these indirect references, which can be understood to be the ruler's responses to the Pharaoh.

THE ROYAL GRANT

The Grant is funded activities that do not have to be paid back, under most conditions. M. Weinfeld defines royal grants in the Levantine area as representing a master's obligation to his servant. In other words, the "grant" mainly serves to protect the rights of the servant and is a reward for his loyalty and good deeds.⁵ This perspective can be applied to the current contribution. Hence, from a rather simplified perspective, the grants are provided by a great power to the petty kinglets to ensure the vassals' loyalty and enforce the Pharaoh's policies.

The Amarna letters shed light on the Canaanite rulers' requests for royal grants, such as ransom, supplies and provisions from grain, and payments of silver and gold. It is clear that these grants were provided by the Pharaohs in exchange for determining a city's status according to Egyptian policy goals (as will be discussed below). Egypt decided who should be rewarded in return for their loyalty and obedi-

³ Gordon 1983: 292-294, 380-381; Bleiberg 1984: 155-167; 1988: 157-168; 1996: 90-114; Spalinger 1996: 353-376; Panagiotopoulos 2000: 148-151; 2001: 270; Hallmann 2006.

⁴ Millek 2020: 108.

⁵ Weinfeld 1970: 185.

ence; the provision of such supplies was practically useful, particularly when they could be employed against the Egypt's enemies. As Weinfeld points out, lesser rulers did not hesitate to request grants, rewards, and the king's protection⁶ in return for their loyalty.

Egypt's interests in Syria-Palestine were flexible and diversified. Its position was further strengthened by encouraging, promoting and establishing relations with rulers of frontier peoples with ambivalent loyalties, which served as a buffer between two polities (Egypt and the Hittites, after the fall of the Mitanni), and often profited from their liminal status.⁷ Rulers of these border areas took advantage of their cities' significance to Egypt by demanding additional grants.

A notable Type of the Egyptian grant and compensation system represented in "ransom" described by Akizzi of Qatna:

May my lord se[nd the ransom] for the men of Qatna [and] may he ransom them. Let them come hither, my lord. As for the money of their ransom, as much as it may be, and I will verily pay the money. (EA 55: 49-52).⁸

Also, Akizzi petitioned the Pharaoh for gold to refashion a "divine statue" that had been captured when the Hittite king had raided his territory:

Take it under consideration, my lord, and may he furnish it, viz. the shekel(s) of gold as much as is needed for the sun god, the god of my father. As soon as he does thus for me, then the name of my lord will be (exalted) before the sun god, just as in the past. (EA 55: 61-66).⁹

⁶ Liverani 2001: 133.

⁷ Morris 2006: 186; 2015: 321; 2018: 171, 172; Panagiotopoulos 2000:146; Ridley 2019: 238.

⁸ Rainey 2015: 403.

⁹ Rainey 2015: 405.

Such “requests” reflect the loyalty in return for the protection principle; the Levantines kinglets were accustomed to their overlord’s protection in return for their cities’ loyalty, and obviously expect Egyptian reinforcements to help them safeguard their territories,¹⁰ perhaps reflecting to the concept of patronage.¹¹ Akhenaten (ca. 1348-1331 B.C.),¹² probably responded to Akizzi in specific terms, when he learned of the Hittite attack, which posed a serious threat to Egyptian hegemony. On the same raid or a different one, Aitakama, the ruler of Qadeš, had invited Akizzi to join the Hittite king (EA 53: 11-15),¹³ and subsequently, the Hittite troops’ actions were accompanied by political pressure on several local rulers. E. Morris argues that: “The Egyptians would have known that in the face of their own inaction such offers would have become increasingly inviting and difficult to refuse.”¹⁴ In the same context, J. Freu has commented that Akizzi is the only Egyptian vassal who addresses himself to the Pharaoh by his name.¹⁵ It can be observed only within “international” letters from the “Great Powers’ Club.”¹⁶ A possible interpretation of this fact is that Akizzi became the servant of the Pharaoh voluntary, which gave him the privilege of addressing himself to the Pharaoh by name,¹⁷ thus Akizzi believed that—according to the political circumstances surrounding him—¹⁸he had the right to request grants and gifts and to take advantage of his border city’s significance to Egypt.

Akizzi was able to gain the attention of Akhenaten, as is evident from a letter sent by the latter to Qatna, which was mentioned by Akizzi

¹⁰ Liverani 2001: 133; Gianto 2009: 282.

¹¹ Some scholars argue that Qatna enjoyed political independence, and Akizzi was therefore in a position to choose between two patrons (Akhenaten and Šuppiluliuma I), see Gromova 2007: 304; Klengel 2009: 41.

¹² About this date see Cabrol 2000.

¹³ Giles 1997: 221-222.

¹⁴ Morris 2018: 171.

¹⁵ Freu 1992: 63.

¹⁶ Mynářová 2005: 449.

¹⁷ Gromova 2007: 304.

¹⁸ For more details about the events described in the letters of Akizzi, see Freu 1992: 63-66; Klengel 1992: 156-157; Richter 2002: 612-616; Mynářová 2005: 455; Gromova 2007: 303-306.

in the context of his own letter (EA 56). According to Akizzi, Akhenaten said to him that “You did not write [to m]e about (their) num[bers] (the Hittite troops)” (EA 56: 7-8). Perhaps the Egyptian messenger to Qatna had carried the ransom and the required amounts of gold to purchase Qatna’s continued political loyalty,¹⁹ as they were not mentioned in the Qatna’s subsequent letters.²⁰

Moreover, in the light of Akizzi’s pleas for the Egyptian goods in his letters to Akhenaten, as well as the need to access supplies and gifts, a mutual exchange of objects took place between Qatna and Egypt during the reign of Akhenaten; this is archaeologically attested by the clay sealing with the throne name of Akhenaten found at Qatna. The clay sealing attests to the existence of an Egyptian object that was sent to Qatna from Egypt.²¹

The situation of Byblos also alludes to the unique system of Egyptian royal grants to reinforce the loyalty and dependency of its loyal cities. Accordingly, Byblos also asked the Pharaohs for grants to the loyal city. As further elucidated below, by tracing the relationship between Egypt and Byblos through royal grants, it is clear that the relationship passed through two phases.

BYBLOS DURING THE REIGN OF AMENHOTEP III (CA. 1387-1348 B.C.)²²

According to Egyptian ideology, a “loyalty oath” occurred between the Pharaohs and their vassals that carried no obligation on the Pharaoh’s part and the petty states received nothing in return; neverthe-

¹⁹ Morris 2006: 188.

²⁰ The Egyptians routinely bestowed statues on polities that they viewed as loyal to their cause and wanted to reward. This also acted as a model of the domestic propaganda of the New Kingdom Egyptian hegemony. Egyptian sources articulated such policy by referring to the king’s unflinching generosity in rewarding “those that are upon his water” those loyal to Egypt. About these rewards, see: Westendorf 1974: 47-50; Forstner-Müller, Müller and Radner 2002: 161-162; Abo-Eleaz 2014: 269-272; Morris 2015: 325-328.

²¹ Ahrens 2012: 1; Ahrens, Dohmann-Pfälzner and Pfälzner 2012: 238-239; Ahrens and Pfälzner 2012: 34-35.

²² About this date, see Cabrol 2000.

less, the first reward for submission was to “grant breath/life.” Submission and loyalty meant to surrender their goods and labor for a “life” that was considered to be a monopoly of the Pharaoh, whereby the implication of the “life” ideology was linked to the circulation of goods. “Life” or “living” denoted physical survival in the face of famine and starvation. Life became equated with “food,” and the Pharaoh was the only dispenser of life in that, as the head of the agency of redistribution, he ensured the productivity of the land and the overall functioning of the state’s economic organization. From the Levantine perspective, a petty king who was a faithful servant must be protected, and if he was in need, he was entitled to be kept alive in the practical sense of being nourished.²³

According to this concept, and as a result of his deep acquaintance with Egyptian ideology (EA 73: 39-40), Rib-Adda of Byblos convinced Amenhotep III that he had continued the commitment, obedience and loyalty provided by his forefathers (EA 74: 5-12). The Pharaoh gave political life, as well as “food,” to his foreign subjects in exchange for their “loyalty,” which the Pharaoh should provide to society as a “benevolent Lord.”²⁴ The difficult economic circumstances of Byblos (EA 68: 27-29) was frequently cited among Rib-Adda’s repeated demands for grants to remain alive and continue to perform his duties to defend the king’s city (EA 74: 5-12; 83: 27-33). It is noteworthy that Rib-Adda’s repeatedly demanded the grant of sustenance from the produce of the land of Yarimuta (EA 86: 27)—a cereal production zone devoted to direct economic exploitation by Egypt located in the coastal area between Beirut and Sidon, wherein the agricultural products from the fertile fields around Şumur were stored²⁵—Rib-Adda thus wrote:

May the king heed the words of his servant and may he grant sustenance to his servant and may he keep his servant alive and

²³ Liverani 2001: 98-99, 161-165; Pfoh 2016: 37-38; Murnane 2000: 105.

²⁴ Gestoso Singer 2008: 26.

²⁵ Halpern 2011: 141.

I will guard his faithful [city] with our La[dy] (and) our deity, f[or you]. (EA 74: 53-57).²⁶

N. Na'aman argues that:

Rib-Adda who, again and again, asks for silver and provisions for subsistence..., it is hardly conceivable that he expected Egypt to send him all these for nothing. His words should be interpreted as a request for provisions in return for payment.²⁷

Despite Rib-Adda's claim that he had paid all that he possessed for food from Yarimuta or Tyre (EA 74: 13-16; 75: 10-14; 77: 14-15; 81: 38-40; 85: 10-14, 33-38; 90: 36-43), it seems that he wanted the produce free of charge in order to face staggering safety issues.²⁸

From an Egyptian ideological perspective, foreign lands belonged to the king by right of a divine bequest. This was because of the Egyptian belief that foreigners did not know how to live or how to use their resources, the lands, the inhabitants and resources had to voluntarily be given up to the Pharaoh.²⁹

According to K. Polanyi redistribution is a principle of socio-economic organization typical of a centralized power such as Egypt, and it manifests itself through the centralization of the surplus of goods. According to this centrality model, goods from Egypt and the foreign countries moved to a single center (the Egyptian state), from which they were redistributed between the local and foreign populations. The center obtained and coordinated the movement of all goods and was the only entity capable of redistributing "life," understood as "food," to the periphery.³⁰

If we assume the validity of Sh. Ahituv's claim that Egypt did not need to import cereals, the grain collected as a tribute in Syria-

²⁶ Rainey 2015: 457.

²⁷ Na'aman 2000: 129.

²⁸ Mynářová 2015a: 160.

²⁹ Redford 2006: 328-329.

³⁰ Polanyi 1976: 162-163; Gestoso Singer 2008: 28; Millek 2020: 90.

Palestine was not sent to Egypt, but rather dedicated to the supply of the Egyptian army and administration in the same Syro-Palestinian possessions.³¹

Accordingly, this surplus of goods could have encouraged Rib-Adda to demand grain,³² and it seems that Amenhotep III had agreed to give him the supplies. This is indirectly evident in a letter from Rib-Adda to Aman-Appa, a high Egyptian official, in which the latter stated:

But you s[ay] to me, “Don’t be afra[id],” and you kept saying to me “Send a ship to the land of Yarimuta so that silver for clothing will be issued to you from it. (EA 82: 25-30).³³

Rib-Adda referred to the same incident: [No]w you have said, “Yanḥamu [s]ent grain to y[ou]. (EA 86:15-16).³⁴

There is also a reference to the Egyptian response to the request for grants in a letter to the King: “Furthermore, inasmuch as Yanḥamu said: “I [ga]ve grain to Rib-Adda” and I will give him [...] “the branches [...] grain for forty men.” (EA 85: 23-28).³⁵

Rib-Adda even admitted that he had provisions later (EA 112: 50-56); however, he was able to provide a number of reasons for his demand for grain: (1) assistance in exchange for the continued loyalty asserted from the days of his forefathers (EA 74: 10-12; 75: 7-9); (2) to sustain both his life and the life of the city (EA 85: 33-38; 86: 31-37); (3) to provide provisions to the Egyptian military forces (EA 125: 14-21; 130: 21-25); (4) to feed the horses that help him defend the city (EA 86: 38-40); and (5) his own grain had been looted (EA 86: 38-39; 90: 62-64; 91: 14-16).

³¹ Ahituv 1978: 96-104.

³² Bienkowski 1989: 60. The textual and archaeological evidence indicated that some of these city-states (e.g., Yarimuta, Ullaza, Qatna, etc.) were quite wealthy (see *Urk* IV: 666-667; Na’aman 1981: 172-185; Redford 2003: 73; Abo-Eliaz 2017: 31-32). However, the specific case of Rib-Adda requesting grain may reflect an actual shortage of resources.

³³ Rainey 2015: 487.

³⁴ Rainey 2015: 505.

³⁵ Rainey 2015: 487.

On another occasion, Rib-Adda indicated that his loyalty had been rewarded by a gift of asses: “[Ear]lier the king ordered [with regard] to the asses that they be g[ive]n to (his loyal) servant (EA 94: 74-78).”³⁶

These asses had already been granted as a form of economic assistance for the transport of goods under Byblos’ difficult circumstances, as is evident from the Egyptian general’s letter to Rib-Adda (EA 96: 12-24).

Thereafter, Rib-Adda once again requested grants to sustain the lives of his own people; he also requested ransom money in the form of gold and silver due to his struggle with ‘Abdi-Aširta to protect his city, to cover spending for horses and grain,³⁷ and to pay ‘Abdi-Aširta to lift the siege³⁸:

My orchards [and] my [field]s were cut down. I am plundered of my [gra]in. But you could [not] give one thousand (shekels) of silver [or] one hundred (shekels of) gold that he should depart from me. (Referring to ‘Abdi-Aširta). (EA 91: 14-19).³⁹

From Rib-Adda’s point of view, this reason was sufficient to give him a ransom for those who had been captured.

Another case of a grant is recorded in a letter from Rib-Adda to Aman-Appa in the context of a complaint about a request for 30 pairs of horses granted by the king, of which Aman-Appa had seized 10 of them for himself: “Why should the king g[rant] 30 pairs of [horses] and you your[self] take 10 pairs? (EA 86: 41-48).”⁴⁰

M.-E. Abo-Eliaz suggests that this case was an example of administrative corruption within the Egyptian palace.⁴¹ While J. Mynářová states:

³⁶ Moran 1992: 168.

³⁷ Gestoso Singer 2010: 263; Halpern 2011: 142.

³⁸ Giles 1997: 175.

³⁹ Rainey 2015: 523.

⁴⁰ Moran 1992: 158.

⁴¹ Abo-Eliaz 2018: 31.

There seems to exist a possibility that even after the king himself takes his decision, it is up to his entrusted official to step actively into the process and to change—if necessary—the king's decision after he evaluates the situation on the spot... The existence of high officials responsible for carrying out the Pharaoh's decisions yet capable of acting on their own is well illustrated.⁴²

BYBLOS DURING THE REIGN OF AKHENATEN (CA. 1348-1331 B.C.)

During the reign of Akhenaten, Egyptian interests in the Syro-Palestinian region significantly changed.⁴³ Hence, Rib-Adda's traditional methods as an administrative expert with the Pharaoh became useless. Not realizing this, he continued to apply to Egypt for royal grants, (EA 130: 39-42), using his loyalty declaration as sufficient reason to exclusively rely on the Pharaoh, as he had done during the reign of Amenhotep III (EA 109: 5-8; 117: 7-11; 124: 32-36; 125: 31-38). According to L. Pryke:

If Rib-Addi's comments about loyalty are analyzed in terms of content and context, it can be shown that Rib-Addi's most common motivation for making a declaration of loyalty is the pursuit of a reward, either in the form of military aid or material goods. Twenty out of forty-five declarations of loyalty seem to have this motivation.⁴⁴

Thus, it is not surprising that he demanded that the Pharaoh provide food grants, as the king was responsible for the redistribution of food (EA 112: 54-56). However, despite Rib-Adda's repeated requests for food, he received no response, as he summarized in his letter to the

⁴² Mynářová 2015a: 152.

⁴³ For further discussion about the Egyptian interests in the Levant from the reign of Amenhotep III to Akhenaten, see Weinstein 1981: 15; 1998: 223-236; Redford 1984: 185-203; Aldred 1999: 117-126; James 2000: 112-124; Ridley 2019: 225-228.

⁴⁴ Pryke 2011: 412.

Pharaoh: “Why are supplies not issued to me from the palace? (EA 126: 50-51).”⁴⁵

Rib-Adda had no choice but to use his wit to address the king in order to obtain royal grants that would help him to control his city. He tried: (1) an insistent recourse to direct repeated requests (EA 116: 13-16, 44-46); (2) eloquently stressing his “loyalty,” which he did not limit to his person, but also extended to his city of Byblos⁴⁶ (EA 116: 54-56); and (3) the use of the diplomatic style employed among the Great Kings (EA 9: 11-13, 19-23; 16: 13-21), comparing Akhenaten with his father by noting that Amenhotep III had responded to his requests and was more generous than him, including giving him silver (EA 109: 5-8; 117: 21-28; 121: 41-44; 125: 14-21; 127: 30-34).

Despite all the above, Akhenaten did not respond to Rib-Adda’s request for grants as he did for other rulers (EA 126: 14-18). Rib-Adda interpreted that refusal as being rooted in personal reasons related to him, rather than questions regarding the loyalty of Byblos, as international relations were often cast as inter-personal relations between two rulers: “If the king hates his city, then I will abandon it, but if it is me (he hates) then I will absent myself, then send your man, let him g[uard] it. (EA 126: 44-49).”⁴⁷

What were the reasons behind Egypt’s treatment of Byblos? According to Rib-Adda’s claim the king had given grants to other rulers (EA 126: 14-18), which confirms that he dealt with each city according to his interests and whims (EA 148: 4-8). Akhenaten had apparently sent a number of demands for goods (e.g., boxwood), to Rib-Adda, however the latter had failed to respond (EA 126: 4-10). Rib-Adda’s actions likely derived from the Levantine perspective of protection vs loyalty, or he anticipated reciprocity;⁴⁸ thus, he cited the

⁴⁵ Rainey 2015: 659.

⁴⁶ Liverani 2004a: 100-101; Mynářová 2013: 84.

⁴⁷ Rainey 2015: 659.

⁴⁸ Pfoh 2019: 254; Mynářová 2010: 76. The expectation of reciprocity appeared when the king requested Rib-Adda get some of his messengers into Sumur; Rib-Adda reports the success of the mission (EA 112: 40-56, 116: 19-24). Therefore, in his collaboration with the Egyptians in matters relating to Sumur, Rib-Adda expected something in exchange for his services (i.e., horses, chariots for his military support and provisions), see Kilani 2019: 162.

impossibility of preparing the required goods due to a grave situation of upheaval in his city as well as the lack of Egyptian grants and troops (EA 126: 4-10).

Given that Akhenaten required the fulfillment of his wishes and personal requests in exchange for grants or gifts, when Rib-Adda failed to deliver the requested boxwood, complaining that Aziru of Amurru (c. 1345-1315 B.C.)⁴⁹ commanded the trade routes, Akhenaten made an application to Aziru instead. This could explain Akhenaten's gifts and grants to Aziru, documented in Aziru's letters to the Pharaoh (EA 160: 9-19; 168: 6-11). It seems that Aziru's understanding of the Egyptian ideology had led him to obstruct the trade routes between Egypt and Byblos, thus Aziru obtained provisions, gifts, grants, as well as payments of silver and gold from Egypt. Moreover, Egypt's interest in the border areas between the Egyptian and Hittite territories (e.g., Amurru, Qatna), as well as Hittite threats to the Egyptian hegemony (some cities like Qadeš had been joined to Ḫatti), could explain why Aziru was given grants and gifts as well as the king's rejection of Rib-Adda's demands for military assistance against Aziru.

It is notable that the more difficult the economic circumstance, the more Syro-Palestinian rulers tried to obtain a "grants of life" (i.e., material subsistence) in the form of "food."⁵⁰ This is evident from the ruler of Tyre Abi-Milki's requests for the "grant of life" (EA 148: 9-12, 26-33; 149: 50-54): "May the king give his attention to his servant and give him Uzu for his life/living" (EA 150: 14-21).⁵¹ In addition, he stated:

So may the king turn his attention to [his] ser[vant] and to the city of Tyre, the city of Maya[ti], to provide [wood] and water to give him life/living. (EA 155: 59-64).⁵²

A new case of the Egyptian grant to Akka is recorded also in a letter from Rib-Adda to the Pharaoh, in which Rib-Adda asks the

⁴⁹ Singer 1991:148 ff.

⁵⁰ Liverani 2000: 98-99, 164.

⁵¹ Moran 1992: 237.

⁵² Rainey 2015: 779.

Pharaoh to give him a comparable grant to that of Surata, the ruler of Akka, which consists of 400 men and 30 pairs of horses (EA 85: 15-22). This demonstrates that Akka could have served as the main harbour for Egyptian interests, and controlled of the various kingdoms located in the northern part of southern Levant during the Amarna Period.⁵³

THE ROYAL GIFT

The Amarna correspondence clearly refers to the gift exchange among the Great Kings. Various scholars have extensively discussed the actual nature and importance of these gifts/ exchanges (the greeting gift, trade of goods, arms trade, etc.).⁵⁴ It was not only the rulers of the Great Kingdoms who engaged in such traffic; rather, the correspondence also refers to some cases of gift exchanges and offerings from the Pharaohs to the Canaanite rulers.

The First Case: Benefit Exchange Gifts/Gift-for-gift

The Egyptian-Ugaritic correspondence documents the exchange of royal gifts, including a gift sent by Ḫeba, the queen of Ugarit to the queen of Egypt. This letter belongs in the time of Niqmaddu II of Ugarit (ca. 1350-1315 B.C.)⁵⁵: “[.....y]ou have given to me [.....and n]ow I [....t]o my lady [.....] a beer jar of aromatics \\ balsam (EA 48: 5-8).”⁵⁶

This passage indicates that the Ugaritic queen had given the Egyptian queen a gift in return for one that the latter had previously sent.

⁵³ Artzy 2018: 90-92.

⁵⁴ Zaccagnini 1973: 117-124; Liverani 2000: 181-188; Mayes 2016: 152-153; Zaccagnini 2000: 144-146; Morkot 2007: 175-177; Gestoso Singer 2006: 189-211; Kopanias 2015: 31-33; Feldman 2006: 1-22, 59-68, 105-114; Peyronel 2014: 356-362; Millek 2020: 107-113.

⁵⁵ Moran 1992: 120 n.1; Liverani 1998a: 286 [LA 258]; Rainey 2015: 1392.

⁵⁶ Rainey 2015: 379.

Another example comes from the reign of Niqmaddu II, who asked the Pharaoh to send him a physician and two Nubians. His request was accompanied by a greeting gift:

[...] ‘and’(?) [...] my father, formerly [...] and my lord. May he give to me two youths, palace personnel of the land of Cush. And give to me a palace retainer, a physician. There is no physician here. Now ask [Ḥa]ramassa ‘and’... And now [...] and one hundred [...] for [your] greeting [gift]. (EA 49: 18-29).⁵⁷

This request reflects one way of exchanging gifts between palaces, which could be compared to exchanging gifts and women, whereby the specialists would represent a kind of “symbolic capital” offered as a gift exchanged between royal courts. The exchange of specialists who travelled from one court to the other was a frequent occurrence in the context of the diplomatic contacts between the “Great” and “Petty” kings of the Late Bronze Age.⁵⁸ The skilled specialists who were sent from one court to another were viewed as prestige goods and valued for their professional capabilities.⁵⁹ A court’s possession of foreign specialists also helped to enhance its prestige and legitimize its status, power, and authority.⁶⁰ Thus, the two Nubians servants mentioned in the letter represented a prestige good; physicians were also considered luxury goods, and they were exchanged just like the princesses who were part of marriage exchanges.⁶¹

EA 49: 18-21 shows that the policy of gift exchanges between Egypt and Ugarit had been followed since ‘Ammittamru I’s reign (?-ca.1350 B.C.).⁶² His successor Niqmaddu II, expressed his desire to

⁵⁷ Rainey 2015: 381.

⁵⁸ Zaccagnini 1983: 250; Pfoh 2016: 78-79; 2019a: 260.

⁵⁹ Zaccagnini 1987: 59.

⁶⁰ Pfoh 2016: 80.

⁶¹ Zaccagnini 1983: 251-252; Pfoh 2019a: 261.

⁶² Many of Amenhotep III and Tiye’s scarabs have been found inside the royal Ugaritic palace, certainly indicates a mutual exchange of diplomatic gifts since ‘Ammittamru I’s reign, see Lagarce-Othman 2017: 182.

continue the exchanges between the two palaces. The flow of prestigious presents from Egypt is shown by the hundreds of pieces of alabaster vessels, many of them inscribed at Ugarit; one of them carries the cartouches of Akhenaten and Nefertiti.⁶³ This raises the question of why gifts were exchanged between Egypt and Ugarit.

Answering this question requires determination of the nature of the relationship between Egypt and Ugarit, which has been discussed by a number of other scholars.⁶⁴ The Amarna letters from Ugarit provide the strongest evidence to support the supposition of the kingdom's submission to Egypt. Characteristic stylistic features and expressions indicate a dependency on the king of Egypt, while A. Altman, suggests it by

*no means constitute conclusive evidence for the subordination of the addresser to the addressee. The same traits might as well have been employed as a courteous form of address indicating differences in age, office, rank, power, prestige.*⁶⁵

Further examination shows that the letters from Ugarit comprise a combination of “vassal” and “international” components.⁶⁶ Therefore, some features indicate that Ugarit's level of independence and status at that time were significantly higher than those of the Canaanite petty city-states.⁶⁷ Among these features was Niqmaddu II's request for the king of Egypt to send him a physician of high standing along with two Nubians who had been trained at the Egyptian royal palace. Similar personal requests were characteristic only of “international” (kings on par with Egypt) rather than “vassal” correspondence.⁶⁸

⁶³ Singer 1999: 625; Weinstein 1989: 17.

⁶⁴ So, e.g., Astour 1981: 17-19; Klengel 1992: 130-131; Singer 1999: 621-627; Altman 2008: 32-38; Halayqa 2010: 298; Zangani 2017: 151-159.

⁶⁵ Altman 2008: 38.

⁶⁶ Mynářová 2006: 121; Halayqa 2010: 298.

⁶⁷ Altman 2008: 38.

⁶⁸ Altman 2008: 39; Bryce 2003: 113-119; Mynářová 2006: 125.

These personal requests could also be interpreted by considering the nature of Ugarit's relationship with Ḫatti following its submission to Ḫatti, when the last kings of Ugarit dealt with Hittite kings without fulfilling their vassal's obligations, leading the Hittites to be dissatisfied with Ugarit's loyalty.⁶⁹ Ugarit dealt with the Great Kings (whether Egypt or Ḫatti) according to their own perspective. In the case of Ugarit being exposed to threats, the form of the loyal vassal is used, which reflects in Amarna letters or Hittite treaties.⁷⁰ In the case of Ugaritic commercial dealings or special requests, the Ugarit kings dealt—according to their perspective—by the model of reciprocity, which could explain Ugarit's requests to exchange gifts with Egypt.

The Second Case: Egypt Offers a Gift

The Canaanite rulers and their messengers had to present themselves at the royal court bearing tribute before the king at a designated time each year (EA 263: 6-17; 270: 9-13),⁷¹ as well as during important celebrations and official feasts.⁷² The petty kings had to wait for long periods for an audience,⁷³ and it was common for foreign envoys and messengers to reside in the royal court for indefinite periods.⁷⁴ It is certain that they were met by their Overlord, and they were at least treated like messengers of Great Kings (EA 3: 16-20; 7: 8-9). Hospitality rules demanded that they were to be given food and drink in the presence of the king,⁷⁵ and the waiting period was used to draw up a response for the messenger delegation to take back to their own kings and/or to compile a consignment of gifts to accompany them.⁷⁶ As evidenced by

⁶⁹ Halayqa 2010: 311-312.

⁷⁰ EA 45: 25-35; 47:12-21; Beckman 1996: 30-31.

⁷¹ Panagiotopoulos 2000: 141-144.

⁷² Redford 1992: 200; Abo-Eleaz 2019: 11.

⁷³ Warburton 2001: 73.

⁷⁴ Abo-Eleaz 2018: 29.

⁷⁵ Head 2011: 84.

⁷⁶ Bryce 2003: 61; van der Toorn 2000: 102.

a letter from an unknown ruler (EA 263: 6-17), the Pharaoh granted vassals gifts upon the occasion of their appearances before him.

At the moment of their departure, the envoys of Great Kings often received garments, ornaments, weapons, metal objects, and quantities of silver,⁷⁷ which reflected how the Egyptians perceived the importance and status of their respective countries. Envoys and messengers of vassals could as well as be recipients of generous gifts from the Pharaoh according to the importance of their countries; for example, the messenger of Akka was honored more than Byblos' messengers; the Egyptians had furnished the former with the gift of a horse, while they had seized two horses from the latter's messengers. Thus, the Egyptian administration's treatment of the Levantine kinglets varied.⁷⁸

Rib-Adda said to Amenhotep III, in the context of his complaint about the Egyptian neglect of his messengers:⁷⁹

Still, the messenger of the king of Akka is honored more than [my] messeng[er], f[or they fur]nished [h]im with a horse. [May he furn]ish him (my messenger)...with two horses. May he not come out [empty handed] (EA 88: 45-51).⁸⁰

A letter from Aziru to Akhenaten indicates that the former had received a royal gift in return for a special gift that he had presented to the Pharaoh (EA 168: 9-10) on the occasion of his visit to Egypt:⁸¹

And may my lord be apprised that Ḥatip is taking half of the things that the king, my lord has given (to me). And Ḥatip is taking all the gold and the silver that the king, my lord, gave to me. So may my lord be apprised (EA 161: 41-46).⁸²

⁷⁷ Lafont 2001: 49; Liverani 2001: 74; Bryce 2003: 65, 91.

⁷⁸ Abo-Eleaz 2018: 31.

⁷⁹ Abo-Eleaz 2018: 27.

⁸⁰ Moran 1992: 161.

⁸¹ Na'aman 2000: 129.

⁸² Rainey 2015: 801.

A shipment of gold and silver that Aziru received from Akhenaten may also have been a gift intended to secure the mountain warlord's loyalty, as Aziru's kingdom lay on the border between the Egyptian and the Hittite spheres of influence, and he was therefore in a position to play one off against the other and adopt a more independent attitude toward the Pharaoh.⁸³ Seizing on Şumur, which was also the recipient of the Egyptian-owned grain supplies, and then forcing the Egyptians to deal with him seems to have been quite profitable for Aziru (EA 86: 31-37). Akhenaten himself wrote to Aziru, stating: "if you perform your service for the king, your lord, what is there that the king will not do for you?" (EA 162: 33-34). Vassals who acted as agents for Egyptian interests could receive gold, silver, and other provisions. When Aziru sent to Akhenaten "tribute" in the form of timber (EA 160: 14-19), Akhenaten reciprocated with deliveries of silver and gold (EA 161: 44-46); however these gifts seem to have been confiscated by an Egyptian official following charges that Aziru had not only attacked the Egyptian base of Şumur under false pretenses, but had also entertained Hittite messengers in a much more sumptuous manner than he had received Egypt's envoys (EA 161: 47-53).⁸⁴

Tagi, the ruler of Gath-Carmel, indicated also in a letter to the Egyptian king that he received a royal gift:

My own man I sent along with [...] to see the face of the king, my lord. [And] the king, my lord, [s]ent a gift to me in the care of Tahmaya, and Tahmaya gave (me) a gold goblet and 1[2 sets] of linen garments. For the information [of the kin]g, my lord. (EA 265: 3-15).⁸⁵

It could be that Tagi sent in return a gift to the Egyptian king: "[And] now, [I have] se[nt leather] harness [for a t]eam of hor[ses and

⁸³ See Izre'el, Singer 1990: 138-142; Beckman 1996: 32; Liverani 2004b: 133-135; Cordani 2011: 103; Devecchi 2012: 39-41.

⁸⁴ Westbrook 2005: 224; Morris 2018: 171; Morris 2010: 430.

⁸⁵ Moran 1992: 314.

a b]ow and [a qu]ive[r], [a s]pea[r, (horse) blankets, [t]o the king, [my] lo[rd]. (EA 266: 26-33).”⁸⁶

The Third Case: Canaan’s Rulers Request a Gift

The Amarna’s correspondence indicates that some rulers demanded gifts from the Pharaoh in exchange for their loyalty, and the Pharaoh’s responses varied according to their status. The citizens of ‘Irkata sent an initial request of a gift from Akhenaten as a reward for their loyalty: “May the king, our lord, heed the words of his loyal servants and may he grant a gift on his servant<s> so that our enemies will see and eat dirt. (EA 100: 31-36).”⁸⁷

W. Moran interprets this passage as follows:

*The loyalty of ‘Irkata had been questioned by the king, who had learned of the city’s giving gifts to Mittani. The writers defend themselves by pointing out that Mittani had cooperated in the war against ‘Abdi-Aširta and his ‘Apiru followers, the very ones responsible for killing their own king whom the Pharaoh had placed over them.... If my understanding of this passage is at all correct, then the attack on Amurru may have contributed to the capture of ‘Abdi-Aširta.*⁸⁸

If Moran’s understanding of the above passage is correct, “the subsequent requests of the citizens of ‘Irkata” could be explained as requiring a gift from the Pharaoh in exchange for their loyalty. The request for a gift also reflected Pharaoh’s friendly attitude toward ‘Irkata at this critical time would reassure the demoralized city. As a sign of continued good relation, it might also discourage its foes from further harassment.⁸⁹ On the other hand, Morris refers to Egyptian fears after the leader of ‘Irkata had recently been assassinated by the ‘Apiru,

⁸⁶ Rainey 2015: 1061.

⁸⁷ Rainey 2015: 551.

⁸⁸ Moran 1992: 173 n.6.

⁸⁹ Barré 1982: 271.

that it would be drawn into the Hittite orbit. In view of the fact that the city had options when it came to overlords, the elders of 'Irkata felt free to request a gift from Egypt.⁹⁰

Another example is when Milkilu of Gezer asked the Pharaoh to grant him a gift of myrrh for healing (EA 269: 14-17). It appears that Milkilu sent this request in the context of the Pharaoh's own request to bring maidservants: "[And now,] I [have sent under the authori]ty of Ḥay[a]: forty six serving women and five servitors and five ašîrûma to the king, my lord (EA 268: 15-21)."⁹¹

It seems that the southern Canaanite city-states were responsible for providing beautiful women to the Egyptian palace.⁹² Thus, the Pharaoh paid Milkilu the equivalent of 1,600 shekels of silver for 40 beautiful female cupbearers (EA 369: 2-23), although the Pharaoh was not obliged to offer rewards or gifts in exchange for his requests.⁹³ Therefore, Liverani considers that this transaction was purely commercial.⁹⁴

DISCUSSION

The Egyptian policy was for Pharaohs to conduct nearly annual campaigns for the solidification of state domination; the regular repetition of visits to subject territories afforded Pharaohs the opportunity to renew oaths, punish rebels, and confer rewards upon rulers who had proven their loyalty.⁹⁵ Pharaohs relied on the judicious employment of coercion and a policy of persuasion; however, the economic costs of annual campaigns would have been formidable. Thus, the Egyptians were able to operate their domination at relatively low cost.⁹⁶ Tributes and security were Egypt's main concerns, and due to the well-defined

⁹⁰ Morris 2018: 171.

⁹¹ Rainey 2015: 1065.

⁹² Na'aman 2002: 80.

⁹³ Liverani 2001: 98-99, 161.

⁹⁴ Liverani 1998a: 99.

⁹⁵ Abo-Eliaz 2019: 16-17.

⁹⁶ Morris 2018: 137, 172.

non-existence of a single administrative structure in the Canaanite cities,⁹⁷ the Pharaoh carefully refrained from further involving himself in some of their affairs.⁹⁸ Instead, Egypt relied on loyal local princes to administer Pharaoh's affairs, because it was more economically beneficial to Egypt.⁹⁹

So, as Morris argues:

*The notion of rewarding those who remained loyal to the Pharaoh, however, was a concept generated in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, when the rulers were attempting to transform an informal empire into a functioning and relatively self-sustaining system.*¹⁰⁰

The Egyptian monuments and inscriptions make no display of the royal grants and gifts sent to foreign courts.¹⁰¹ In the Egyptian worldview, the Pharaoh's power was endowed with absolute preeminence and centrality; therefore, considering that the Egyptian King is the only receiver of gifts, it could be stated that official inscriptions and scenes were primarily a form of propaganda reinforcing the ruler's control over the inner Egyptian populace. Nevertheless, in the Amarna letters provide a different picture on all levels whether (Great Kings or petty kings).¹⁰² It is possible to distinguish between the gifts and grants from the Pharaoh to a Levantine vassal as follows.

⁹⁷ Redford 1992: 196.

⁹⁸ Some scholars have even suggested that the Pharaoh had interest in fostering political tension amongst its vassals; the argument is that the Pharaoh would have preferred a divided Canaan, rife with in-fighting, to a united Canaan in which the mayors tried to get the Pharaoh involved in their own power game, of interest only to themselves. The many indications of the Pharaoh's indifference only mean that the Pharaoh understood the game very well and saw little reason to interfere. See Several 1972: 129; Morris 2005: 228; Lemche 2016: 137.

⁹⁹ Smith 1995: 12; Hoffmeier 2004: 127.

¹⁰⁰ Morris 2018:137.

¹⁰¹ Hallmann 2006.

¹⁰² Redford 1992: 196; Liverani 2001: 179-181; Bleiberg 1985: 86: 5-13; Wilkinson and Doyle 2017: 90.

The Policy of Persuasion and Reciprocal Exploitation

Socio-economic studies of so-called primitive economies have shown gift/grant exchanges at a head-of-state level to be part and parcel of a policy of creating spheres of influence by setting up lines of mutual obligation.¹⁰³ During the Amarna period, several letters from the Levantine petty kings disclose their appropriation of Egyptian phraseology, pragmatics, and ideological terms. They understood the Egyptian royal terms and were able to use them to address the Pharaoh according to Egyptian ideological terms such as “life,” (EA 74: 55-9) “the king of (all) lands,” “my god,” “the Sun from heaven,” “the son of the Sun,” “the Sun of (all) lands,” “the breath of my life,” and “my breath;” they also mixed these terms with other Levantine ones, including “the king of the battle,” “my father,” and “my Sun,”¹⁰⁴ when conveying their demands for protection in exchange for loyalty, according to the Levantine ideology. Subsequently, is it possible to conclude that the ideology of concepts such as “brotherhood” and “lovers” among equal parties ranked as the model of diplomatic interactions involving gift exchange? To exchange gifts means to be on friendly terms with someone, to be his “brother,” to “love” him. Other schemes such as “patron” vs. “vassals” were employed in patronage relationships¹⁰⁵ as justification for gift-giving.

The political articulations and dynamics marked by semantic interferences in the political communication between the ruler and the ruled, i.e., between Egypt and petty Kings, may be interpreted within a general framework covering a variety of interaction forms, among which was the exchanging of gifts.

It could also be said that Egyptian propaganda reflected a centralist ideological perspective toward foreigners,¹⁰⁶ which is clearly evidenced in the scenes of foreigners bearing tribute, gifts, and annual

¹⁰³ Zaccagnini 1973: 9-12 ff; Liverani 1979: 21-23.

¹⁰⁴ Mynářová 2012: 551; Morris 2006: 181-185; Schloen 2001: 313.

¹⁰⁵ Zaccagnini 1987: 64; Wilkinson and Doyle 2017: 89.

¹⁰⁶ Redford 1995: 168-169.

taxes to lay before the Pharaoh.¹⁰⁷ The merciful Pharaoh expressed his kindness, generosity, and hospitality by granting them gifts. On the other hand, according to Levantine ideology, those gifts became part of the international diplomatic protocol during the Late Bronze Age.¹⁰⁸ If the exchange of gifts was a feature of diplomatic relations during that period, it could be that, according to the patronage model, some of the petty kings understood themselves to be vassals and loyal servants of the Pharaoh, therefore reciprocity was always expected.¹⁰⁹ Hence, they had the opportunity to obtain royal gifts (the most obvious cases are Amurru and Qatna).¹¹⁰ It could be difficult to rely heavily on the patronage model, to explain the Egyptian royal gift to other petty kings, because patronage could have no place, in such a despotic, one-sided relationship—particularly the language of the Canaanite vassals, which themselves serves to reinforce an impression of absolutism. In any case, there existed a clash of ideological and political conceptions on certain aspects of vassalage between the Pharaoh and the Syro-Palestinian petty kings. The issue is not so much which status is to apply but rather that each side picks out a particular aspect of one or other status that happens to serve their interest (as in the case of Aziru).¹¹¹ However, in all cases, we should note that this diplomatic custom among the Great Kings was not available to all of the Canaanite vassals, but rather proceeded in accordance with Egypt's interests with each of Levantine city-state.

Moreover, it should be also taken into consideration that whatever the vassals might have petitioned for and received from the Pharaoh, these requests and gifts were structured and represented differently from those between Great Kings—especially regarding the nature and style of demand, the quantities required, and the goals of their request.

¹⁰⁷ Redford 1988: 14-15; Aldred 1970: 105-116.

¹⁰⁸ Pfoh 2016: 67-72.

¹⁰⁹ Pfoh 2019b: 256.

¹¹⁰ Westbrook 2005: 225-226; Pfoh 2009: 366-377.

¹¹¹ Liverani 2001: 160-165; Westbrook 2005: 224; Pfoh 2009: 366.

Egyptian Royal Gifting Practices

The Amarna letters also indicate that some of these Canaanites could have considered themselves to be part of the Egyptian administration by describing themselves as mayors when addressing the Pharaoh.¹¹² Although this might be interpreted as a surrender to Egyptian political hegemony, the Canaanite rulers enjoyed some benefits from their interaction with the Egyptians.¹¹³ Likely, the Pharaohs perceived the importance and status of their respective countries, as Canaan was more urban, socially stratified, and had educated and literate bureaucrats.¹¹⁴ So, Pharaohs considered the Canaanite rulers to be “mayors” similar to those in the local Egyptian administration system (*H3ty-‘*).¹¹⁵ Therefore, the same duty to perform the loyalty oath in the Pharaoh’s name was devolved upon them, and the same taxes and services were demanded from them as from their Egyptian counterparts.¹¹⁶ The Pharaohs would often reward loyal nobles and Egyptian local officials with gifts in exchange for their loyalty, obedience, devotion; scenes depicting gift exchanges and rewards were a major element of the funerary decorations in the tombs of Amarna.¹¹⁷

Accordingly, the Pharaohs might offer to the Canaanite rulers some gifts and rewards similar to those conferred upon their peers inside Egypt. As some scholars have mentioned, this view is supported by the possibility that many of the high status and costly items in the Levantine graves and temple such as Egyptian statues, jars, scarabs, seals, etc.,¹¹⁸ had been sent as gifts from the Pharaoh or members of the

¹¹² Redford 1992: 196-198.

¹¹³ Koch 2018: 26.

¹¹⁴ Smith 1995: 12.

¹¹⁵ Redford 1990: 29; Darnell and Manassa 2007: 145.

¹¹⁶ Murnane 2000: 107; Mynářová 2013: 81 n.10.

¹¹⁷ It was the most frequent scene at the private tombs of Amarna, such as Ramose, Ay, Mahu, Meryre, Parennefer, Pentu, and Tutu, see Radwan 1969: 72; Murnane 1995: 63, 112, 150, 153, 178, 182, 194; Schulman 1988: 116; Morkot 2003: 33, 55.

¹¹⁸ Egyptian sources, on the other hand, make plain how desirable gift exchanges and offerings are, from a moral and pious point of view, for a monarch to bestow as votive offerings on “a god in a land far away whom the people love.” See Redford 1981: 174-175.

Egyptian elite to Canaanite dignitaries during national festivals in order to strengthen the connection of these local elites to Egypt.¹¹⁹ Thus, it could be interpreted that Amenhotep III's scarabs found in Qatna and Ugarit, and Akhenaten's clay sealing at Qatna, were the result of Egypt's strategy to send personalised gifts with other diplomatic gifts to Levantine regions.¹²⁰ These items and goods from Egypt not only reinforced their loyalty to the Pharaoh but also confirmed their political and social status.¹²¹

It could be assumed that during the lengthy waiting periods spent by the Canaanite visitors within the residences allocated for foreign envoys in Egypt. Diplomats were provided with opportunities to gain information on a wide range of matters,¹²² which may have included identifying which gifts they had received from the Pharaoh. Therefore, when the envoys returned home, everything they had seen inside the corridors of the Egyptian palace including the envoys of other countries was conveyed to their rulers (EA 47: 12-21). According to this scenario, the Canaanite rulers demanded similar gifts (the case of the messenger of Byblos and Akka), as those received by their counterparts according to the Near Eastern perspective that they dealt with each other as kings (*šarrū*) of equal status.¹²³ However, the Egyptian response remained subject to Egyptian interests, which varied from one city-state to the other (see **Table 1**).

¹¹⁹ Bianchi 2001: 180; Forstner-Müller, Müller and Radner 2002: 160-166; Teeter 2003: 14; Darnell and Manassa 2007: 145; Martin 2011: 253; Koch 2018: 28.

¹²⁰ Ahrens 2012: 1; Boschloos 2015: 379-380.

¹²¹ Boschloos 2012: 10.

¹²² Bryce 2003: 65, 60.

¹²³ It appears that these rulers only referred to themselves using the word *hazannu* (mayor) (CAD H (6): 163-165), when writing to the Egyptian king; otherwise, they referred to themselves using term *šarrū* (king) (CAD Š (17/2): 76-114). On other hand, when addressed by their subjects and neighbors, including the kings of Babylon and Mitanni, the Levantine rulers were referred to by the designation *šarrū* (EA 8: 25-26; 30: 1-2).

Geographic	City-State	Categories of grants/gifts according to the					Extent of response	Evidence
		Description	Methods of receiving	Type	Amount	Aim		
Northern Canaan	Qatna	Grant	Requested	Gold	Unknown	To refashion one stauē	May have been responded	EA 55: 61-66
	Qatna	Grant	Requested	Payment	Unknown	The ransom money	May have been responded	EA 55: 49-52
	Byblos	Grant	Requested	Grain	Unknown	Economic aid	Responded	EA 74: 5-12; 83: 27-33; 86: 27
	Byblos	Grant	Requested	Asses	Unknown	Economic aid	Responded	EA 94: 74-78
	Byblos	Grant	Requested	Gold or silver	100 (shekels) of silver [or] 100 (shekels) of gold	Payment for grain and ransom	Responded	EA 91: 14-19
	Byblos	Grant	Requested	Horses	30 pairs	Military-Economic aid	Responded	EA 86: 41-48
	Byblos	Grant	Requested	Grain	Unknown	Economic aid	Not responded	EA 130: 39-42
	Tyre	Grant	Requested	Territory	Unknown	Economic aid	Unknown	148: 9-12, 26-33; 149: 50-54
	Ugarit	Gift	Requested	Balsam	One jar	Prestige	Unknown	(EA 48:5-8).
	Ugarit	Gift	Requested	Specialists	Physician and two Nubian	Prestige	Unknown	EA 49: 18-29
	Amurru	Gift	Granted	Payment	Gold and Silver	Loyalty insurance	Responded	EA 161: 41-46
Irqata	Gift	Requested	Unknown	Unknown	Loyalty insurance	Unknown	EA 100: 31-36	
Southern and central Palestine	Unknown	Gift	Granted	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	EA 263: 6-17
	Akka	Grant	Granted	Troops Horses	400 men 30 pairs	Military aid	Responded	EA 85: 15-22.
	Akka	Gift	Granted	Horses	One horse	Transport	-	EA 88: 45-51
	Gath-Carmel	Gift	Granted	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	-	EA 265: 3-15
	Gezer	Gift	Requested	Medicinal plant	Myrrh	Healing	May have been responding	EA 269: 14-17

Table. 1

The Egyptian Grants and Gifts for Canaanite Rulers in the Amarna Letters.

Antiguo Oriente, volumen 19, 2021, pp. 65–112.

In the Amarna correspondence, gift requests were particularly frequent among equal kings.¹²⁴ The exchanges between “Great Kings” and “Small Kings” reflects Liverani’s proposed “prestige and interest” model.¹²⁵ Small Kings gained elevated pride and social status before their peers when the Great King conferred gifts upon them—see the difference between Akka and Byblos (regarding the horses), and Amurru and Byblos (when Rib-Adda failed to obtain silver).¹²⁶ The importance of the quantity of gifts may not be calculable; however, such items may have carried even greater symbolic weight. In this context, Morris argues that:

*The elders of ‘Irqata, for instance, like jealous, ever-vigilant sibilings, Levantine vassals monitored the gifts given to their contemporaries closely, for such gifts of men and supplies seem to have served as tangible symbols of their comparatively greater access to the Pharaoh’s ear and strong arm.*¹²⁷

Thus, they requested gifts from the Pharaoh (EA 100: 31-36). In short, it could even be said that a small quantity of gifts reflected greater prestige among their peers, as it was possible to obtain a small amount of a beer jar of balsam (Ugarit) or myrrh (Gezer) by having their messengers purchase them while they were in Egypt.

It could be said that, in addition to the prestige conferred upon the king of Ugarit by obtaining a physician and two dark-skinned Nubian servants, the exchange of specialists also reflected functional needs.

Notably, the following paragraph was repeated in the Amarna letters in several cases when the Pharaoh had sent a gift to one of the Canaanite rulers through one of his representatives: “For the informa-

¹²⁴ Liverani 2000: 24; Avruch 2000: 160.

¹²⁵ Liverani 2001: 9-11.

¹²⁶ In this context, Aldred (1970: 111) argues that “The withholding of such a valuable gift diminished his standing in the eyes of other princes, and he renewed his appeal for it.”

¹²⁷ Morris 2010: 430.

tion [of the kin]g, my lord” (EA 265: 14-15; 301: 20-23; 309: 25-28). Perhaps repetitions of this complaint reflected the Egyptian officials’ dishonesty.¹²⁸ Thus, often, each item was ticked off and weighed piece by piece before it was crated so that the receiver might check the integrity of the shipment. The purpose was to preclude any opportunities for pilfering or embezzlement.¹²⁹ Such an interpretation explains the complaints to Rib-Adda from Aman-Appa and to Aziru from Ḫatip.

As C. Zaccagnini¹³⁰ points out, the requests for gifts and grants reflect two patterns: 1) the richness and abundance enjoyed by the Pharaoh, which was a possible impetus for Rib-Adda’s request for the grant of grain, as well as Akizzi and Rib-Adda’s ransom demands; 2) the functional requisites of the awaited gift, as shown in Rib-Adda’s request for 30 pairs of horses or asses, Niqmaddu’s petition for a physician and two Nubians, and Milkilu’s request for myrrh. Thus, in many cases, the party who is asking for a gift tried to justify their requests by citing their intended uses for protection, the transport of goods, hospitalization, and service within the palace.

According to the above, the grant can be defined as non-refundable economic assistance provided by Egypt to the Canaanite petty city-states through economic crises. In addition, the grants aimed to ensure the continued loyalty of petty rulers. It is worth noting that Egypt did not offer any grant until after the petty rulers requested it. While, the gift is goods supplied by Egypt, often under normal conditions, some gifts were requested by the petty rulers, and some of them had been offered by Egypt in exchange for other goods (see **Table 2**).

¹²⁸ The complaint of embezzlement of gifts is repeated even among great kings (e.g., the envoys of Babylon), so, it was important to send to a recipient a detailed list of the goods dispatched to them, see Bryce 2003: 93-94.

¹²⁹ Bryce 2003: 90; Zaccagnini 1987: 61.

¹³⁰ Zaccagnini 1987: 59.

Criteria	The grants	The gifts
The receiving	The Canaanite city-states from Egypt or vice versa	The Canaanite petty city-states
The timing	Time of crisis	Under normal circumstances
The quality	Necessary goods and items	Luxury items
The quantity	Large	Little
The aim	The recipient	Life protection
	The sender	Maintain loyalty
The place of delivery	From Egypt or Canaan	From Egypt
The modality of grant	It must request	It can ask or send without request
The target group	Citizens	Royal families
The target places	Strategic and border areas	Strategic and economically important to Egypt
The Canaanite places most benefit	Northern Canaan	Southern and central Palestine

Table 2

Difference between grants and gifts in the Amarna Letters.

From the above, certain questions arise. Did these requests of gifts and grants reflect a situation in which Egyptian power in Canaan was on the wane¹³¹ and the Pharaoh could no longer make extortionate demands of his vassals?

This traditional view can be countered. When the nature (quality) of grants and gifts and the goals of their request and provision is considered, it is possible to conclude that we have two types of grants/gifts:

Grant/Gifts offered to Border Areas (Strategic Interests)

Such cases clearly indicate that both the sender and the receiver have benefit from the provision of grants/gifts. The sender (Pharaoh)

¹³¹ This question has been discussed by several scholars (see e.g., Liverani 1967; 1971; 2001; Moran 1985; 1995; Na'aman 1990).

benefited by securing the receiver's loyalty in the face of outside powers, saving large campaign costs which far exceeded the value of the gifts and grants. This strategy cannot be regarded as reflecting Egyptian weaknesses in the Amarna period;¹³² the Pharaoh was able to send a military campaign to eliminate 'Abdi-Aširta's aspirations,¹³³ and many letters indicate the preparations of supplies and troops prior to the arrival of the Egyptian army during the reign of Akhenaten.¹³⁴

With regard to the receivers, the gift or grant requests reflected that the recipients had turned to Egypt (e.g., Akizzi of Qatna) rather than resorting to another major power emerging on the Syrian scene (Hittites) as had other city-states, e.g., Qadeš, (EA 53: 24-25).

The quality of the gifts did not reflect the receiver's power, and the letters describe payments for grain, ransoms, or small amounts of gold to create a single statue; in the context of international shifts, these were a cheap price to pay for these border areas to remain loyal to Egypt. Thus, the Pharaoh distributed gifts/ grants for strategic reasons rather than as a dyadic obligation to all vassals (**Table 1**).

Grants and Gifts for Life

Unlike the Great Kings, the Canaanite petty rulers did not ask for luxury gifts or grants,¹³⁵ for which value could be assessed based on type or quantity. Rather, their requests encompassed necessities such as grain (Byblos, EA 83: 27-33; 85: 33-38), *myrrh* (Gezer, EA 269: 14-17), sources of water and wood (Tyre, EA 147: 63-66; 148: 26-34; EA 150: 17-26; 155: 7-17), and a small amount of gold and silver (Byblos, EA 91: 14-19). Such grants and gifts do not indicate the decline of Egyptian hegemony; rather, they can be seen to indicate the power of the sender (the Pharaoh) as the receivers' only lifeline in times of crisis. This then could be exploited by the Pharaoh for propaganda presented

¹³² Liverani 1998a: 30-32.

¹³³ Altman 1977: 1-10; Liverani 1998b: 387-394; Bryce 2014: 52.

¹³⁴ Schulman 1964: 63; Giles 1997: 149-157; Ridley 2019: 242-243.

¹³⁵ EA 3: 15; 7: 69-72; 10: 19-20; 20: 46-59; 29: 70-75; Podany 2010: 247-249.

to the internal public, or to support the ideology of the Pharaoh as a sacred figure who guaranteed the cosmic order in both Egypt and foreign lands. The Pharaoh also provided the “breath of life” to both Egyptians and foreigners through the establishment of order (*M3‘t/Ma’at*).¹³⁶ Thus, such gifts or grants did not reflect the Pharaoh’s weakness before the recipients’ power because Egypt was the greatest beneficiary of such exchanges.

In short, the content of the Amarna letters differs from that of the southern vassals and letters from northern Canaan.¹³⁷ The sociopolitical matrix of Syria-Palestine deviated significantly from North to South. While Southern Canaan had traditionally been within the Egyptian sphere of influence, the northern Levant had a significant Hurrian cultural presence as well as some Indo-European elements.¹³⁸ Perhaps this explains why the northern regions were the most demanded as providers of grants and gifts, whereas the southern regions were most often the recipients of grants and/or gifts.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of Egyptian grants to Syro-Palestinian rulers can be viewed in the context of reciprocal exploitation. From the Egyptian perspective, the purpose of the grants was to maintain the vassals’ loyalty to Egypt; as such, their price was relatively inexpensive, particularly if we keep in mind that the grants of grain were not sent from Egypt’s Delta or Nile valley, but rather were taken from the crops of Yarimuta, the Jezreel Valley, and other grain stores in Syria-Palestine. If we assume that the gifts and grants were conferred according to policies established during the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty to maintain Egyptian domination in the strategic zones (e.g., Qatna, Amurru), then such rewards reinforced the city-states’ loyalty to Egypt at least up to the time of Šuppiluliuma I’s campaigns.

¹³⁶ Flammini 1996: 5-6.

¹³⁷ Liverani 1998a: 40-41.

¹³⁸ Mynářová 2007: 42; Zangani 2018: 406.

According to the Levantine perspective these Canaanite rulers assumed that protection was part of their rights as return for loyalty to the Egyptian king (Byblos in particular). Consequently, any default from him required that the provision of substitutes or repercussions should be faced. From their perspective, as result of the Egypt's failure to maintain security and fulfill their protection in the face of the enemy threats, the Levantine vassals were thus able to exploit the significance of their geographic position to request additional grants, such as alternative gold to make a statue that the Hittites had stolen, or ransom money to extricate men from captivity. Egypt's response to grant requests reflected the ability of these border city-states to influence the Pharaoh, and the requests were frequently framed by using the outside powers card (Hittites) as a means to draw the Pharaoh's attention and ensure an immediate response.

Four categories of grants can be differentiated, namely: 1) payments (gold/silver), 2) grain, 3) territory (e.g., Uzu), and 4) modes of transport and defense (**Table 1**).

This study has revealed that the gift exchanges between the Egyptian Pharaohs and the other kings of the Near East were not exclusive to the Great Kings, as Egypt also provided gifts to some of its loyal vassals. Although, according to the Egyptian perspective, the Pharaoh did not need to offer rewards or gifts in return for anything he required, it can be said that some rulers took advantage of the Pharaoh's annual tribute demands or special requests on those occasions when they appeared before him at the Egyptian palace (the case of Akka) or while awaiting the coming of the itinerant commissioners to demand special gifts (the case of Gezer). These vassals may have found such occasions to be an appropriate opportunity to demand special gifts. Although the annual tributes or Pharaoh's special requests are not defined or all registered, it could be said that the Canaanite rulers' gifts and special requests documented in the Amarna letters were not the only items that the Pharaoh gave to Canaan; rather, the Egyptian Royal Commissioner, a roving Egyptian inspector or courier, was asked during his visits to orally convey other requests to the Pharaoh, and upon their return, they

may have brought gifts with them as well as new lists of the Pharaoh's wishes. Perhaps this scenario explains the paragraph frequently seen in the Canaanite rulers' correspondence to the Pharaoh that they had obeyed all the king's orders sent to them via the commissioners (EA 216: 12-14; 217: 13-18; 218: 13-14; 220: 10-14, 25-30; 225: 7-9; 294: 9-10; 317: 19-25; 367: 6-10). This paragraph justified the Pharaoh's fulfillment of their requests, according to the Levantine perspective; in return for the Egyptian gifts, obedience was declared, and the Pharaoh's requests were fulfilled.

In some cases, the gifts sent by the Egyptian king fulfilled real needs or the Canaanite rulers' desire to achieve high status in the eyes of their peers; however, it must be said that the Egyptian gifts to the Canaanite rulers mainly reflected the nature of the Egyptian's interests, as evidenced by clear variations in a city-state's status in the Egyptian palace. In sum, vassals that acted as agents for Egyptian interests could receive gold, silver, grain, horses, myrrh, clothing, water, and other provisions.

Three methods of gift-giving can be differentiated: 1) gifts provided to the petty kings at the Egyptian palace, 2) gifts provided to vassals' messengers; and 3) gifts sent by Egypt's royal representatives. Notably, the main differences between these gifts reflect the geographic nature of Egyptian interests in the Levant, for example the rulers of southern and central Palestine, whose gifts were provided at the Egyptian palace (e.g., Akka, Gath-Carmel, unknown city EA 263). Also, even in the case of Gezer, the request for myrrh was made in the context of a paid trade exchange with Egypt; the exchanges conferred mutual benefits that reflected these city-states' high status in the Egyptian court compared to Northern Canaan. The Pharaoh's ordering of gifts from the rulers of the northern regions (e.g., Ugarit, Byblos, Amurru, 'Irqata, and Qatna), reflected the political circumstances in the buffer zones and the Lebanese mountain regions.

In conclusion, the northern regions were the most demanded as providers of grants and gifts, while the southern regions were most often the recipients of grants or gifts from the Pharaohs during the

Amarna period, which reflected the aims of the Egyptian policy toward individual regions (see **Table 2**).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ABO-ELEAZ, M.-E.E. 2014. *KPN (Jbeil/ Byblos) City and its Relations with Egypt until the End of the Second Millennium B.C.* PhD diss., Minia University [in Arabic].
- ABO-ELEAZ, M.-E.E. 2017. "The Egyptian role in Ullaza during the Second Millennium B.C." In: *Egyptian Journal of Archaeological and Restoration Studies* 7/1, 27-37.
- ABO-ELEAZ, M.-E.E. 2018. "Neglect and Detention of Messengers in Egypt during the Fourteenth and Thirteenth Centuries BCE." In: *Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt* 54, 17-34.
- ABO-ELEAZ, M.-E.E. 2019. "Face to Face: Meetings between the Kings of Egypt, Ḫatti and their Vassals in the Levant during the Late Bronze Age." In: *Studien zur Altägyptischen Kultur* 48, 1-21.
- AHRENS, A. 2012. "New Evidence for Contacts between Egypt and the Northern Levant during the Amarna Period: A Clay Sealing with the Throne Name of Akhenaten at Tell Mišrife/Qatna (Syria)." In: *Journal of Ancient Egyptian Interconnections* 4/4, 1.
- AHRENS, A. and PFÄLZNER, P. 2012. "Akhenaten in Syria." In: *Egyptian Archaeology* 41, 34-35.
- AHRENS, A., DOHMANN-PFÄLZNER, H. and PFÄLZNER, P. 2012. "New Light on the Amarna Period from the Northern Levant. A Clay Sealing with the Throne Name of Amenhotep IV/Akhenaten from the Royal Palace at Tall Mišrife/Qatna." In: *Zeitschrift für Orient-Archäologie* 5, 233-248.
- AḤITUV, S. 1978. "Economic Factors in the Egyptian Conquest of Canaan." In: *Israel Exploration Journal* 28, 93-105.
- ALDRED, C. 1970. "The Foreign Gifts Offered to Pharaoh." In: *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 56, 105-116.
- ALDRED, C. 1999. *Akhenaten: King of Egypt*. New York, Thames and Hudson.

- ALTMAN, A. 1977. "The Fate of Abdi-Ashirta." In: *Ugarit-Forschungen* 9, 1-10.
- ALTMAN, A. 2008. "Ugarit's Political Standing in the Beginning of the 14th Century BCE Reconsidered." In: *Ugarit-Forschungen* 40, 25-64.
- ARTZY, M. 2018. "From Akko/Acco to Beit She'an/Beth Shan in the Late Bronze Age." In: *Ägypten und Levante/Egypt and the Levant* 28, 85-98.
- ASTOUR, M.C. 1981. "Ugarit and the Great Powers." In: YOUNG, G.D. (ed.), *Ugarit in Retrospect: Fifty Years of Ugarit and Ugaritic*. Winona Lake, IN, Eisenbrauns, 3-29.
- AVRUCH, K. 2000. "Reciprocity, Equality, and Status-Anxiety in the Amarna Letters." In: COHEN, R. and WESTBROOK, R. (eds.), *Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 154-164.
- BARRÉ, M.L. 1982. "A Cuneiform Parallel to PS 86:16-17 and Mic 7:16-17." In: *Journal of Biblical Literature* 101/2, 271-275.
- BECKMAN, G. 1996. *Hittite Diplomatic Texts*. Atlanta, Scholars Press.
- BIANCHI, R.S. 2001. "Scarabs." In: REDFORD, D.B. (ed.), *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt*. Vol. 3. New York, Oxford University Press, 179-181.
- BIENKOWSKI, P. 1989. "Prosperity and Decline in LBA Canaan: A Reply to Liebowitz and Knapp." In: *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 275, 59-63.
- BLEIBERG, E.J. 1984. "The King's Privy Purse During the New Kingdom: An Examination of INW." In: *Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt* 21, 154-167.
- BLEIBERG, E.J. 1985-1986. "Historical Texts as Political Propaganda during the New Kingdom." In: *Bulletin of the Egyptological Seminar* 7, 5-13.
- BLEIBERG, E.J. 1988. "The Redistributive Economy in New Kingdom Egypt: An Examination of bAkw(t)." In: *Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt* 25, 157-168.
- BLEIBERG, E.J. 1996. *The Official Gift in Ancient Egypt*. London, Routledge.
- BOSCHLOOS, V. 2012. "Late Bronze Age Cornelian and Red Jasper Scarabs with Cross Designs. Egyptian, Levantine or Minoan?" In: *Journal of Ancient Egyptian Interconnections* 4/2, 5-16.

- BOSCHLOOS, V. 2015. "A Scarab of Amenhotep III in Qatna's Lower City Palace." In: PFÄLZNER, P. and AL-MAQDISSI, M. (eds.), *Qatna and the Networks of Bronze Age Globalism. Proceedings of an International Conference in Stuttgart and Tübingen in October 2009*. Qatna Studien Supplementa 2. Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 377-382.
- BRYCE, T. 2003. *Letters of the Great Kings of the Ancient Near East: The Royal Correspondence of the Late Bronze Age*. London, New York, Routledge.
- BRYCE, T. 2014. *Ancient Syria: A Three Thousand Year History*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- CABROL, A. 2000. *Amenhotep III, Le Magnifique*. Mónaco, édition du Rocher.
- CAD 6 = GELB, I., OPPENHEIM, L., REINER, E., ROTH, M. and GELB, I. (eds.), 1956. *The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago*, H. Vol. 6. Chicago, The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago.
- CAD 17 = BRINKMAN, J., REINER, E., GELB, I. and ROTH, M. (eds.). 1992. *The Assyrian Dictionary*, Š. Vol. 17. Part II. Chicago, The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago.
- COHAVI-RAINEY, Z. 1999. *Royal Gifts in the Late Bronze Age: Fourteenth to Thirteenth Centuries B.C.E.* Vol. 13. Beer-Sheva, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press.
- CORDANI, V. 2011. "Aziru's Journey to Egypt and Its Chronological Value." In: MYNÁŘOVÁ, J. (ed.), *Egypt and the Near East-the Crossroads: Proceedings of an International Conference on the Relations of Egypt and the Near East in the Brone Age, Prague, September 1-3, 2010*. Prague, Charles University, 103-116.
- DARNELL, J.C. and MANASSA, C. 2007. *Tutankhamun's Armies: Battle and Conquest During Ancient Egypt's Late Eighteenth Dynasty*. Hoboken, NJ, John Wiley & Sons.
- DEVECCHI, E. 2012. "Aziru, Servant of Three Masters?" In: *Altorientalische Forschungen* 39/1, 38-48.
- FELDMAN, M.H. 2006. *Diplomacy by Design: Luxury Arts and an "International Style" in the Ancient Near East, 1400-1200 BCE*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

- FLAMMINI, R. 1996. *Biblos y Egipto durante la Dinastía XII*. Series Monográficas 1. Buenos Aires. CEEMO,
- FREU, J. 1992. “Les guerres syriennes de Suppiluliuma et la fin de l’ère amarnienne.” In: *Bibliothèque des Cahiers de l’Institut de Linguistique de Louvain* 11, 39-101.
- GILES, F. 1997. *The Amarna Age: Western Asia*. Warminster, Aris and Philips.
- GORDON, A.H. 1983. *The Context and Meaning of the Ancient Egyptian Word jnw from the Proto-Dynastic Period to the End of the New Kingdom*. Vol. 1. Berkeley, University of California.
- GROMOVA, D. 2007. “The Hittite Role in the Political History of Syria in the Amarna Age Reconsidered.” In: *Ugarit-Forschungen* 39, 277-309.
- HALLMANN, S. 2006. *Die Tributszenen des Neuen Reiches*. Ägypten und Altes Testament. Vol. 66. Wiesbaden, Harrasowitz Verlag.
- HOFFMEIER, J. 2004. “Aspects of Egyptian Foreign Policy in the 18th Dynasty in Western Asia and Nubia.” In: KNOPPERS, G.N. and HIRSCH, A. (eds.), *Egypt, Israel, and the Ancient Mediterranean World: Studies in Honor of D.B. Redford*. Probleme der Ägyptologie 20. Leiden, Brill, 121-142.
- FORSTNER-MÜLLER, I., MÜLLER, W. and RADNER, K. 2002. “Statuen in Verbannung: Ägyptischer Statuenexport in den Vorderen Orient unter Amenophis III. und IV.” In: *Ägypten und Levante/Egypt and the Levant* 12, 155-166.
- GESTOSO SINGER, G. 2006. “El intercambio de materias primas y bienes de prestigio entre Egipto y Mesopotamia (siglos XV y XIV a.C.).” In: *Aula Orientalis* 24, 189-211.
- GESTOSO SINGER, G. 2008. *El intercambio de bienes entre Egipto y Asia Anterior. Desde el reinado de Tuthmosis III hasta el de Akhenaton*. Ancient Near East Monographs - Monografías sobre el Antiguo Cercano Oriente 2. Atlanta-Buenos Aires, Society of Biblical Literature & Centro de Estudios de Historia del Antiguo Oriente.
- GESTOSO SINGER, G. 2010. “Forms of Payment in the Amarna Age and in the Uluburun and Cape Gelidonya shipwrecks.” In: *Ugarit-Forschungen* 42, 261-278.
- GESTOSO SINGER, G. 2016. ““Amor” y Oro: discurso inter-cultural e identidades de una diosa itinerante en las Cartas de El Amarna.” In: FLAMMINI, R. and TEBES, J.M. (eds.), *Interrelaciones e identidades culturales en el Antiguo Oriente*, volumen 19, 2021, pp. 65–112.

- Cercano Oriente Antiguo*. Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, IMHICIHU - Instituto Multidisciplinario de Historia y Ciencias Humanas, 159-182.
- GIANTO, A. 2009. "Unheeded Pleas to the Powers That Be? On Amarna Akkadian *nenpušu ana and paṭāru*." In: *Orientalia* 78/3, 282-291
- HALAYQA, I. 2010. "The Demise of Ugarit in the Light of its Connections with Ḫatti." In: *Ugarit-Forschungen* 42, 297-332.
- HALPERN, B. 2011. "Voyage to Yarimuta." In: FINKELSTEIN, I. and NA'AMAN, N. (eds.), *The Fire Signals of Lachish Studies in the Archaeology and History of Israel in the Late Bronze Age, Iron Age, and Persian Period in Honor of David Ussishkin*. Winona Lake, IN, Eisenbrauns, 141-158.
- HEAD, R. 2011. "Amarna Messengers and the Politics of Feasting." In: *Maarav* 18, 1-2, 79-87.
- IZRE'EL, S. and SINGER, I. 1990. *The General Letter from Ugarit: A Linguistic and Historical Reevaluation of RS 20.33*. Ugaritica V, n°. 20. Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv University Press.
- JAKOB, S. 2006. "Pharaoh and his Brothers." In: *British Museum Studies in Ancient Egypt and Sudan* 6, 12-30.
- JAMES, A. 2000. "Egypt and Her Vassals: The Geopolitical Dimension. In Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations." In: COHEN, R. and WESTBROOK, R. (eds.), Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 112-124.
- KILANI, M. 2019. *Byblos in the Late Bronze Age: Interactions between the Levantine and Egyptian Worlds*. SAHL 9. Leiden, Brill.
- KLENGEL, H. 1992. *Syria-3000 to 300 BC; A Handbook of Political History*. Berlin, Akademie-Verlag.
- KLENGEL, H. 2009. "Aufstieg und Niedergang. Qatna im 2. Jahrtausend v. Chr.: Al-Maqdissi, M." In: MORANDI BONACOSSO, D. and PFÄLZNER, P. (eds.), *Schätze des Alten Syrien. Die Entdeckung des Königreichs Qatna* 68 (666), 39-41.
- KOCH, I. 2018. "The Egyptian-Canaanite Interface as Colonial Encounter: A View from Southwest Canaan." In: *Journal of Ancient Egyptian Interconnections* 18, 24-39.
- KOPANIAS, K. 2015. "The King's Household: Royal Gifts and International Trade in the Amarna Age." In: *KTĒMA: Civilisations de l'Orient, de la*

Grèce et de Rome antiques 40, 27-34.

- LAFONT, B. 2001. "International Relations in the Ancient Near East: The Birth of a Complete Diplomatic System." In: *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 12/1, 39-60.
- LAGARCE-OTHTMAN, B. 2017. "Les scarabées d'Amenhotep III et de Tiy à Ougarit." In: MATOIAN, V. (ed.), *Archéologie, patrimoine et archives. Les fouilles anciennes à Ras Shamra et à Minet el-Beida I*. Paris, Peeters, 165-185.
- LEMICHE, N.P. 2016. "The Amarna Letters and Palestinian Politics." In: GRABBE, L. (ed.), *The Land of Canaan in the Late Bronze Age*. London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 133-146.
- LIVERANI, M. 1967. "Contrasti e confluenze di concezioni politiche nell'età di El Amarna." In: *Revue Assyriologique* 61, 1-18.
- LIVERANI, M. 1971. "Le lettere del Faraone a Rib-Adda." In: *Oriens Antiquus* 10, 252-268.
- LIVERANI, M. 1979. *Three Amarna Essays*. Malibu, California, Undena.
- LIVERANI, M. 1998a. *Le lettere di el-Amarna*, 1. Le lettere dei 'Piccoli Re'. Testi del vicino Oriente antico 3/1. Brescia, Paideia.
- LIVERANI, M. 1998b. "How to Kill Abdi-Ashirta EA 101, Once Again." In: *Israel Oriental Studies* 18, 387-394.
- LIVERANI, M. 2000. "The Great Powers' Club." In: COHEN, R. and WESTBROOK, R. (eds.), *Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations*. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 15-27.
- LIVERANI, M. 2001. *International Relations in the Ancient Near East, 1600-1100 BC*. New York, Palgrave.
- LIVERANI, M. 2004a. "Rib-Adda, Righteous Sufferer." In: BAHRANI, Z. and VAN DE MIEROOP, M. (eds.), *Myth and Politics in Ancient Near Eastern Historiography*. Ithaca - London, Cornell University Press - Equinox, 97-124.
- LIVERANI, M. 2004b. "Aziru, Servant of Two Masters." In: BAHRANI, Z. and VAN DE MIEROOP, M. (eds.), *Myth and Politics in Ancient Near Eastern Historiography*. Ithaca - London, Cornell University Press - Equinox, 125-146.
- MARTIN, M. 2011. *Egyptian-Type Pottery in the Late Bronze Age Southern Antiquo Oriente*, volumen 19, 2021, pp. 65-112.

- Levant*. Wien, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- MAYES, A. 2016. "International Diplomacy in the Amarna Age." In: GRABBE, L.L. (ed.), *The Land of Canaan in the Late Bronze Age*. London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 147-158.
- MILLEK, J.M. 2020. *Exchange, Destruction, and a Transitioning Society: Interregional Exchange in the Southern Levant from the Late Bronze Age to the Iron I*. *RessourcenKulturen* 9. Tübingen, Universität Tübingen.
- MORAN, W.L. 1985. "Rib-Hadda: Job at Byblos?" In: KORT, A. and MORSCHAUER, S. (eds.), *Biblical and Related Studies Presented to Samuel Iwry*, Winona Lake, In., 173-181.
- MORAN, W.L. 1992 *The Amarna Letters*. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- MORAN, W.L. 1995. "Some Reflections on Amarna Politics." In: ZEVIT, Z., GITLIN, S. and SOKOLOFF, M. (eds.), *Solving Riddles and Untying Knots: Biblical, Epigraphic, and Semitic Studies in Honor of Jonas C. Greenfield*. Winona Lake, In., 559-572.
- MORKOT, R.G. 2003. *Historical Dictionary of Ancient Egyptian Warfare* 26. Oxford, Scarecrow Press.
- MORKOT, R.G. 2007. "War and Economy: The International 'Arms Trade' in the Late Bronze Age and After." In: SCHNEIDER, T. and SZPAKOWSKA, K. (eds.), *Egyptian Stories: A British Egyptological Tribute to Alan B. Lloyd on the Occasion of his Retirement*. Münster, Ugarit-Verlag, 169-198.
- MORRIS, E.F. 2005. *The Architecture of Imperialism Military Bases and the Evolution of Foreign Policy in Egypt's New Kingdom*. Leiden, Brill.
- MORRIS, E.F. 2006. "Bowling and Scraping in the Ancient Near East: An Investigation into Obsequiousness in the Amarna Letters." In: *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 65/3, 179-95.
- MORRIS, E.F. 2010. "Opportunism in Contested lands B.C. and A. D. Or how Abdi-Ashirta, Aziru, and Padsha Khan Zadran got away with Murder." In: HAWASS, Z. and WEGNER, J.H. (eds.), *Millions of Jubilees: Studies in Honor of David Silverman*. Vol. 1. Cairo, Supreme Council of Antiquities, 413-438.
- MORRIS, E.F. 2015. "Egypt, Ugarit, the God Ba'al, and the Puzzle of a Royal Rebuff." In: MYNÁŘOVÁ, J. ONDERKA, P. and PAVÚK, P. (eds.), *There and Back Again—the Crossroads: Proceedings of an International Conference Antiquo Oriente, volumen 19, 2021, pp. 65–112.*

Held in Prague, September 15-18, 2014. Prague, Charles University in Prague, 315-351.

MORRIS, E.F. 2018. *Ancient Egyptian Imperialism*. Hoboken, John Wiley.

MURNANE, W.J. 1995. *Texts from the Amarna Period in Egypt*. Kolkata, Scholars Press.

MURNANE, W. J. 2000. "Imperial Egypt and the Limits of Power." In: COHEN, R. and WESTBROOK, R. (eds.), *Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations*. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 103-124.

MYNÁŘOVÁ, J. 2005. "Akizzi of Qatna—A Case of a Diplomatic faux pas?" In: *Ugarit-Forschungen* 37, 445-459.

MYNÁŘOVÁ, J. 2006. "Ugarit: 'International' or 'Vassal' Correspondence?" In: CHARVÁT, P. LAFONT, B., MYNÁŘOVÁ, J. and PECHA, L. (eds.), *L'État, le pouvoir, les prestations et leurs formes en Mésopotamie ancienne. Actes du Colloque assyriologique franco-tchèque*. Paris, 7-8 novembre 2002. Prague, Univerzita Karlova v Praze, 119-128.

MYNÁŘOVÁ, J. 2007. *Language of Amarna - Language of Diplomacy. Perspectives on the Amarna Letters*. Prague, Charles University in Prague.

MYNÁŘOVÁ, J. 2010. "To Be King, or Not to Be King, or Much Ado About Nothing? The Concept of Royalty in the Amarna Correspondence." In: CHARVÁT, P. and MAŘIKOVÁ, J. (eds.), *Who Was King? Who Was Not King? The Rulers and the Ruled in the Ancient Near East*. Prague, Institute of Archaeology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 71-84.

MYNÁŘOVÁ, J. 2012. "The Representatives of Power in the Amarna Letters." In: WILHELM, G. (ed.), *Organization, Representation, and Symbols of Power in the Ancient Near East*. Proceedings of the 54th Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale at Würzburg, 20-25 July 2008. Winona Lake, Eisenbrauns, 551-558.

MYNÁŘOVÁ, J. 2013. "Being a Loyal Servant. Egypt and the Levant from the Perspective of Juridical Terminology of the 18th Dynasty." In: *Zeitschrift für altorientalische und biblische Rechtsgeschichte* 19, 79-87.

MYNÁŘOVÁ, J. 2015a. "Communicating the Empire, or how to Deliver a Message of a King." In: MYNÁŘOVÁ, J. ONDERKA, P. and PAVÚK, P. (eds.), *There and Back Again - the Crossroads II. Proceedings of an International Conference Held in Prague, September 15-18, 2014, Prague*. Charles

University in Prague, 149-162.

- MYNÁŘOVÁ, J. 2015b. "Egypt among the Great Powers and Its Relations to the Neighboring Vassal Kingdoms in the Southern Levant According to the Written Evidence: Thutmose III and Amarna." In: EDER, B. and PRUZSINSZKY, R. (eds.), *Policies of Exchange. Political Systems and Modes of Interaction in the Aegean and the Near East in the 2nd Millennium B.C.E. Proceedings of the International Symposium at the University in Freiburg Institute for Archaeological Studies*, 30th May - 2nd June, 2012. *Oriental and European Archaeology* 2, 2012. Viena, Academy of Sciences, 155-163.
- NA'AMAN, N. 1981. "Economic Aspects of the Egyptian Occupation of Canaan." In: *Israel Exploration Journal* 31, 172-185.
- NA'AMAN, N. 1990. "Praises to Pharaoh in Response to His Plans for a Campaign to Canaan." In: ABUSCH, T., HUEHNERGARD, J. and STEINKELLER, P. (eds.), *Lingering over Words: Studies in Ancient Near Eastern Literature in Honor of William L. Moran*. Harvard Semitic Studies 37. Atlanta, Scholars Press, 397-405.
- NA'AMAN, N. 2000. "The Egyptian-Canaanite Correspondence." In: COHEN, R. and WESTBROOK, R. (eds.), *Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 125-138.
- NA'AMAN, N. 2002. "Dispatching Canaanite Maidservants to the Pharaoh." In: *Ancient Near Eastern Studies* 39, 76-82.
- PANAGIOTOPOULOS, D. 2000. "Tributabgaben und Huldigungsgeschenke aus der Levante. Die ägyptische Nordexpansion in der 18. Dynastie aus strukturgegeschichtlicher Sicht." In: *Ägypten und Levante/Egypt and the Levant* 10, 139-158.
- PANAGIOTOPOULOS, D. 2001. "Keftiu in Context: Theban Tomb-Paintings as a Historical Source." In: *Oxford Journal of Archaeology* 20, 263-283.
- PEYRONEL, L. 2014. "Between Archaic Market and Gift Exchange: The Role of Silver in the Embedded Economies of the Ancient Near East during the Bronze Age." In: CARLÀ, F. and GORI, M. (eds.), *Gift Giving and the 'Embedded' Economies in the Ancient World*. Heidelberg, Akademie Der Wissenschaften, 356-362.

- PFOH, E. 2009. "Some Remarks on Patronage in Syria-Palestine During the Late Bronze Age." In: *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 52/3, 363-381.
- PFOH, E. 2016. *Syria-Palestine in the Late Bronze Age: An Anthropology of Politics and Power*. London - New York, Routledge.
- PFOH, E. 2019a. "Prestige and Authority in the Southern Levant during the Amarna Age." In: MAEIR, A., SHAI, I. and MCKINNY, C. (eds.), *The Late Bronze and Early Iron Ages of Southern Canaan*. Berlin, De Gruyter, 247-261.
- PFOH, E. 2019b. "Assessing Foreignness and Politics in the Late Bronze Age." In: MYNÁŘOVÁ, J., KILANI, M. and ALIVERNINI, S. (eds.), *A Stranger in the House - the Crossroads III. Proceedings of an International Conference on Foreigners in Ancient Egyptian and Near Eastern Societies of the Bronze Age held in Prague, September 10-13, 2018*. Prague, Charles University, 257-267.
- PODANY, A. 2010. *Brotherhood of Kings: How International Relations Shaped the Ancient Near East*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- POLANYI, K. 1976. "El sistema económico como proceso institucionalizado." In: GODELIER, M. (ed.), *Antropología y Economía*. Anagrama, Barcelona, 155-178.
- PRYKE, L. 2011. "The Many Complaints to Pharaoh of Rib-Addi of Byblos." In: *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 131/3, 411-422.
- RADWAN, A. 1969. *Die Darstellungen des regierenden Königs und seiner Familienangehörigen in den Privatgräbern der 18. Dynastie*. MÄS 21. Berlin, Hesslin.
- RAINEY, A.F. 2015. "The El-Amarna Correspondence: A New Edition of the Cuneiform Letters from the Site of El-Amarna Based on Collations of All Extant Tablets." In: SCHNIEDEWIND, W. and COHAVI-RAINEY, Z. (eds.), *Handbook of Oriental Studies*. Vols.1-2. Leiden, Brill.
- REDFORD, D.B. 1981. "A Note on Shipwrecked Sailor 147-8." In: *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 67, 174-175.
- REDFORD, D.B. 1984. *Akhenaten: The Heretic King*. New Jersey, Princeton University Press.
- REDFORD, D.B. 1988. *The Akhenaten Temple Project, II. Rwd-mnw, Foreigners and Inscriptions*. Toronto, Aris & Philipps.
- Antiguo Oriente*, volumen 19, 2021, pp. 65-112.

- REDFORD, D.B. 1990. *Egypt and Canaan in the New Kingdom*. Beer-Sheva IV. Beer-Sheva, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press.
- REDFORD, D.B. 1992. *Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Time*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- REDFORD, D.B. 1995. "The Concept of Kingship during the Eighteenth Dynasty." In: O'CONNOR, D. and SILVERMAN, D. (eds.), *Ancient Egyptian Kingship*. Probleme der Ägyptologie 9. Leiden, Brill, 157-184.
- REDFORD, D.B. 2003. *The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III*. Leiden, Brill.
- REDFORD, D.B. 2006. "The Northern Wars of Thutmose III." In: CLINE, E. and O'CONNOR, D. (eds.), *Thutmose III: A New Biography*. Ann Arbor, MI, The University of Michigan Press, 324-343.
- RICHTER, T. 2002. "'Einjährige Feldzug" Šuppiluliumas I. von Ḫatti in Syrien nach Textfunden des Jahres 2002 in Mišrife/Qaṭna." In: *Ugarit-Forschungen* 34, 603-618.
- RIDLEY, R.T. 2019. *Akhenaten: A Historian's View*. Cairo, The American University in Cairo Press.
- SCHLOEN, D. 2001. *The House of the Father as Fact and Symbol: Patrimonialism in Ugarit and the Ancient Near East*. Winona Lake, In., Eisenbrauns.
- SCHULMAN, A.R. 1964. "Some Observations on the Military Background of the Amarna Period." In: *Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt* 3, 51-69.
- SCHULMAN, A.R. 1988. *Ceremonial Execution and Public Rewards: Some Historical Scenes on New Kingdom Private Stelae*. Freiburg, Saint-Paul.
- SEVERAL, M. 1972. "Reconsidering the Egyptian Empire in Palestine during the Amarna Period." In: *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* 104/2, 123-133.
- SINGER, I. 1991. "A Concise History of Amurru." In: IZRE'EL, Sh. *Amurru Akkadian: A Linguistic Study*. Vol. 2. Atlanta, Scholars Press, 135-195.
- SINGER, I. 1999. "A Political History of Ugarit." In: WATSON, W. and WYATT, N. (eds.), *Handbook of Ugaritic Studies*. Leiden, Brill, 603-734.
- SMITH, S.T. 1995. *Askut in Nubia: The Economics of Egyptian Imperialism in the Second Millennium B.C.* London, Kegan Paul.
- SPALINGER, A. 1996. "From Local to Global: The Extension of an Egyptian
- Antiguo Oriente*, volumen 19, 2021, pp. 65–112.

- Bureaucratic Term to the Empire.” In: *Studien zur Altägyptischen Kultur* 23, 353-376.
- TEETER, E. 2003. *Scarabs, Scaraboids, Seals and Seal Impressions from Medinet Habu*. Chicago, Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago.
- URK= SETHE, K. 1914. *Urkunden des ägyptischen Altertums, I 4. Urkunden der 18. Dynastie*. Be-arbeitet und übersetzt. Leipzig, Hinrichs.
- VAN DER TOORN, K. 2000. “Cuneiform Documents from Syria-Palestine Texts, Scribes, and Schools.” In: *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins* 116/2, 97-113.
- WARBURTON, D. 2001. *Egypt and the Near East. Politics in the Bronze Age*. Neuchatel, Recherches et Publications.
- WEINFELD, M. 1970. “The Covenant of Grant in the Old Testament and in the Ancient Near East.” In: *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 90/2, 184-203.
- WESTBROOK, R. 2005. “Patronage in the Ancient Near East.” In: *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 48/2, 210-233.
- WILKINSON, R.H. and DOYLE, N. 2017. “Between Brothers: Diplomatic Interactions.” In: P. CREASMAN, P. and WILKINSON, R.H. (eds.), *Pharaoh’s Land and Beyond: Ancient Egypt and its Neighbors*. New York, Oxford University Press, 79-92.
- WEINSTEIN, J. 1981. “The Egyptian Empire in Palestine: A Reassessment.” In: *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 241/1, 1-28.
- WEINSTEIN, J. 1989. “The Gold Scarab of Nefertiti from Uluburun: It’s Implications for Egyptian History and Egyptian Aegean Relations.” In: *American Journal of Archaeology* 93/1, 17-29.
- WEINSTEIN, J. 1998. “Egypt and the Levant in the Reign of Amenhotep III.” In: O’CONNOR, D. and CLINE, E. (eds.), *Amenhotep III: Perspectives on His Reign*. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 223-236
- WESTENDORF, W. 1974. “‘To Be in Someone’s Water’ = ‘To be Dependent on Him.’” In: *Göttinger Miszellen* 11, 47-48.
- ZACCAGNINI, C. 1973. *Lo scambio dei doni nel vicino oriente durante i secoli XV- XIII*. *Oriens Antiqui Collectio* 11, Roma, Centro per le antich. e la storia dell’arte orient.
- ZACCAGNINI, C. 1983. “Patterns of Mobility among Ancient Near Eastern
- Antiguo Oriente, volumen 19, 2021, pp. 65–112.*

- Craftsmen.” In: *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 42/4, 245-264.
- ZACCAGNINI, C. 1987. “Aspects of Ceremonial Exchange in the Near East during the Late Second Millennium B.C.” In: ROWLANDS, M., LARSEN, M. and KRISTIANSEN, K. (eds.), *Centre and Periphery in the Ancient World*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 57-65.
- ZACCAGNINI, C. 2000. “The Interdependence of the Great Powers.” In: COHEN, R. and WESTBROOK, R. (eds.), *The Amarna Diplomacy. The Beginnings of International Relations*. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 141-153.
- ZANGANI, F. 2017. “Amenhotep II and Ugarit: Evidence from Egyptian Phonology.” In: *Göttinger Miszellen* 253, 151-159.
- ZANGANI, F. 2019. “Foreign-Indigenous Interactions in the Late Bronze Age Levant: Tuthmosid Imperialism and the Origin of the Amarna Diplomatic System.” In: MYNÁŘOVÁ, J., KILANI, M. and ALIVERNINI, S. (eds.), *A Stranger in the House - the Crossroads III. Proceedings of an International Conference on Foreigners in Ancient Egyptian and Near Eastern Societies of the Bronze Age held in Prague, September 10-13, 2018*. Prague, Charles University, 405-423.